

Running head: EDUCATION ABOUT TERRORISM CHANGES SOCIAL  
ATTITUDES

Know thy enemy: Education about terrorism improves social attitudes toward terrorists

Jordan Theriault<sup>1</sup>, Peter Krause<sup>2</sup>, Liane Young<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Boston College  
Department of Psychology  
Chestnut Hill, MA, 02467  
USA

<sup>2</sup>Boston College  
Department of Political Science  
Chestnut Hill, MA, 02467

*Corresponding Author:*  
Jordan Theriault  
140 Commonwealth Ave.  
Chestnut Hill, MA, 02467  
300 McGuinn Hall  
617-552-0240  
Fax: 617-552-0523  
jordan.theriault@bc.edu

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## Abstract

Hatred of terrorists is an obstacle to the implementation of effective counterterrorism policies—it invites indiscriminate retaliation, whereas many of the greatest successes in counterterrorism have come from understanding terrorists’ personal and political motivations. Drawing from psychological research, traditional prejudice reduction strategies are generally not well suited to the task of reducing hatred of terrorists. Instead, in two studies, we explore education’s potential ability to reduce extreme negative attitudes toward terrorists. Study 1 compared students in a college course on terrorism (treatment) with wait-listed students, measuring pro-social attitudes toward a hypothetical terrorist. Initially, all students reported extremely negative attitudes; however, at the end of the semester, treatment students’ attitudes were significantly improved. Study 2 replicated the effect within a sample of treatment and control classes drawn from universities across the United States. The present work was part of an ongoing research project, focusing on foreign policy and the perceived threat of terrorism; thus classes did not explicitly aim to reduce prejudice, making the effect of treatment somewhat surprising. One possibility is that learning about terrorists “crowds out” the initial pejorative associations—i.e. the label “terrorism” may ultimately call more information to mind, diluting its initial negative associative links. Alternatively, students may learn to challenge how the label “terrorist” is being applied. In either case, learning about terrorism can decrease the extreme negative reactions it evokes, which is desirable if one wishes to implement effective counterterrorism policies.

*Keywords:* Prejudice, Education, Terrorism, Attitudes

Know thy enemy: Education about terrorism improves social attitudes toward terrorists

The most prominent and prolific terrorist groups today—from ISIS to Al-Qaeda to Boko Haram—welcome our hatred as a key part of their strategy, inviting indiscriminate retaliation that polarizes communities and drives up support for their extreme ideologies and tactics (Kydd & Walter, 2006; Lake, 2002). States driven to pursue these indiscriminate policies have either failed to eliminate terrorist attacks, or have even increased them (Cronin, 2009). By contrast, most successful counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns have involved breakthroughs in understanding the motivations, organization, and strategies of terrorist and insurgent groups. For instance, in the late 1990s, India's government and police were able to fragment and beat back Islamist militants in Kashmir by recognizing cleavages in the insurgency and flipping their former adversaries to fight on their side (Staniland, 2012). In 2006, the United States located and killed the former leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (now ISIS)—Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi—after American intelligence officers interviewed suspects and members of the community to understand the motivations and social ties of the terrorist network (Alexander & Bruning, 2011). The most dramatic example may be Northern Ireland, where centuries of sectarian violence were effectively ended—not through the extermination of all insurgents, but through the inclusion of Sinn Féin (the political wing of the Irish Republican Army) in negotiations and the political process, culminating in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. To effectively combat terrorism, states must understand their adversary as a rational actor who is sustained by recruits, funding, and sanctuary, and who is motivated by political objectives; hatred of terrorists, in either policymakers or the citizens that elect them, is an obstacle to this aim, and may lead to policies that are

the exact opposite of what effective counterterrorism strategy demands. Ironically then, to combat terrorism, we must find ways to reduce prejudice against terrorists.

### **Techniques for Reducing Prejudice**

Prejudice reduction is one of the most prolific areas of research in social psychology; yet, applying it to terrorists—or, for that matter, many real world contexts (Paluck, 2016; Paluck & Green, 2009)—is difficult for a number of reasons. “Implicit attitudes” paradigms have revolutionized our understanding of prejudice, showing that even those who reject explicit prejudice continue to show a measurable bias toward outgroups (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schartz, 1998; Lai et al., 2014). But this research typically focuses on prejudice against marginalized groups (e.g., African Americans, disabled people), where public displays of prejudice are already socially unacceptable. Researchers have rarely turned their attention to the “fundamental challenge” of “[discovering] ways of changing ‘hard-core’ [or extreme] prejudiced beliefs” (Monteith, Zuwerink, & Devine, 1994)—such as explicit racist beliefs, or the extreme prejudice instilled by the label “terrorist”. A similar problem is present in the “minimal-groups” paradigm, where researchers instill, and then attempt to reduce, prejudice between “teams” that were formed on the basis of irrelevant traits (and in actuality were randomly assigned; Tajfel, 1970). This method provides tight experimental control, but the prejudice being studied lacks a real world historical context; it occurs in the absence of any competing or complicating influences. Furthermore, prejudice in the context of minimal groups is typically defined as preference for one’s own team, rather than outright intergroup hostility (Paluck & Green, 2009). Finally, classic approaches to prejudice reduction suggest that prejudice can be reduced by facilitating contact with the outgroup

under ideal conditions (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, & Tropp, 2006; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). Unfortunately, for prejudice against terrorists, this approach is practically and politically unfeasible—most citizens will never interact with a terrorist personally; yet, their attitude toward them remains politically important.

Education, as a technique for prejudice reduction, has the potential to overcome the limitations of the approaches above. It is uniquely positioned to reduce prejudice where explicit antipathy is present, and where parties cannot be physically brought together—this includes (but is not limited to) the case of prejudice against terrorists. People can learn about, and change their attitudes toward, people that they may never encounter. For instance, an education approach was implemented in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: a class of Israeli students studied the history of conflict in other countries (Lustig, 2002; Salomon, 2004). End of term essays, written by treatment students, were more equitable to both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and more likely to be written from the first-person perspective of Palestinians (although the treatment had no effect on students' explicit prejudice against Palestinians). This, and other work (Gurin, Peng, Lopez, & Nagda, 1999; Schaller, Asp, Rosell, & Heim, 1996) give some reason to believe that education-based prejudice reduction can be effective.

Another advantage of an education-based approach is that prejudice reduction is both tested and implemented in the same context—the classroom. In such field-based research, statistically significant effects are difficult to identify, but their ecological validity can generally be trusted, as they must emerge from an environment full of noise and competing influences. Many educational-based interventions are field studies, yet few use well-controlled designs—including control groups, or ideally as-if

randomization—that allow for inferences about the causal effect of treatment. According to a recent review, fewer than 12 of 207 quasi-experimental studies had designs that licensed causal inferences (Paluck & Green, 2009; but see Broockman & Kalla, 2016). Given the lack of field-based, experimental prejudice reduction research, conclusions drawn from the present work may also have implications for prejudice reduction more generally. Reducing antipathy toward terrorists (for the purposes of counterterrorism) may be taken as a case study in reducing extreme and explicit antipathy, and it may be that our findings can be applied to other cases (such as explicit racism, or sectarian hatred).

### **Present Work**

The present work was performed in the context of a larger ongoing research project, exploring the impact of education on attitudes concerning terrorism and foreign policy (thus, the majority of the survey was not focused on attitudes toward terrorists, and classes generally focused on counterterrorism, as opposed to tolerance). In this context, we had the opportunity to explore education's potential role in reducing prejudice toward terrorists. In Study 1, we performed an as-if randomized study, taking advantage of randomized course registration times at our university. Study 2 replicated the effect in a more representative sample, comparing treatment and control classes at 11 universities across the United States.

Because our study was performed in the context of a larger ongoing project, the courses had no explicit anti-prejudice aim. Main themes of the course used in Study 1 were: (a) the individual and group level causes and objectives of terrorism; (b) the methods and mechanisms of terrorism; (c) discussion of recent and ongoing conflicts,

such as conflict with Al-Qaeda and the insurgencies in Iraq and Syria; and (d) counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy (for a complete list of course readings in Study 1, see Appendix A). Prior work has focused on teaching tolerance—e.g., teaching white students about the positive role of intergroup conflict in democratic society, and then tracking their attitudes toward students of color across their university tenure (Gurin et al., 1999)—however, we had no intention of teaching students to tolerate terrorists. Students were simply taught about terrorism, and completed surveys at the beginning and end of the class, allowing us to track any changes in their attitude. It is possible then, that students, or even professors, might show a confirmation bias (Haidt, 2001; Kuhn, 1991; Kunda, 1990; Wason, 1960)—students might only learn, or professors might only teach, information that is consistent with their initial view of terrorists (for an example in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see Gvirsman, Huesmann, Dubow, Landau, Boxer, & Shikaki, 2016). For instance, political conservatives, who are generally more threat-sensitive (for review see Jost & Amodio, 2012), may attend to the most threatening information taught and resist any positive effect of treatment. Likewise, professors may lead their students to adopt their personal viewpoint by consciously or unconsciously presenting selective information about terrorists. In both studies we explore these possibilities, examining biases based on political orientations, self-reported willingness to learn, students' initial attitudes, and even the views of the teaching professors.

## Study 1

### Methods

**Participants.** Fifty-eight students ( $M_{\text{Age}} = 21.3$ ,  $SD_{\text{Age}} = 0.9$ , 34 female, 2 unspecified; Table 1) were given pre-class and post-class questionnaires at the beginning

and end of the semester (Qualtrics software). Thirty-five students completed coauthor PK's class "Terrorism, Insurgency, and Political Violence" at Boston College (Fall 2013,  $n = 17$ ; Spring 2015,  $n = 18$ ); twenty-three students who were wait-listed for the same class (Fall 2013,  $n = 8$ ; Spring 2015,  $n = 15$ ) formed an as-if randomized control group. Wait-listed students had been randomized by the university to receive a later course registration time and had emailed coauthor PK to enroll in the class after it had been filled. The class was filled by 1:55pm (Fall 2013), and 9:32am (Spring 2015) on the first of eight days of registration, making it unlikely that student interest drove their allotment to the treatment or control group; put another way, it was reasonable to assume that wait-listed students would be in a treatment class if they had not been randomly assigned a late course registration time. The pre-class questionnaire was completed on the first day of class, and the post-class questionnaire was completed three months later. Students were included if they completed both the pre-class and post-class survey (response rate: 95.1%). In treatment classes, after both the pre-class and post-class survey, five participating students were randomly awarded \$10 Amazon.com gift cards. Students in the control group who completed both surveys received \$20 Amazon.com gift cards. The Boston College Institutional Review Board approved the study, and informed consent was obtained from all participants.

Table 1. Study 1 classes, response rates and demographics.

School	Professor	Class Name	Semester	Enrollment	Responses	Gender	Age	Political Orientation
Boston College	P. Krause	Terrorism, Insurgency, and Political Violence	Fall, 2013	17	17	9 female 8 male	$M = 21.1$ $SD = 0.8$	$M = 3.7$ $SD = 1.4$
			Spring, 2015	18	18	15 female 3 male	$M = 21.6$ $SD = 0.5$	$M = 2.7$ $SD = 1.3$
		Wait-list	Fall, 2013	11	8	3 female 5 male	$M = 20.6$ $SD = 1.3$	$M = 3.1$ $SD = 1.8$
			Spring, 2015	15	15	7 female 2 unspecified 6 male	$M = 21.1$ $SD = 1.1$	$M = 2.5$ $SD = 1.2$

Political Orientation was measured on a 7-point scale (1 - very liberal; 7 – very conservative). For control samples, enrollment is the number of students who completed pre-class surveys, responses are the number of students who completed both pre- and post-class surveys.

**Procedure and Measures.** Pre-class and post-class surveys were identical. We collected responses for dependent measures, covariates of interest, and other items that were of interest for additional studies (see Supplemental Materials for a complete description). Questions related to social affiliation made up a small percentage of the total survey (one of six blocks, plus demographics), meaning that any attention drawn to terrorists' humanity was most likely diluted among questions about the threat, motives, and effectiveness of terrorists, as well as the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies. Relationships between social affiliation and the measures collected in the remaining blocks were not examined, to avoid introducing unnecessary comparisons in our analysis. Furthermore, while demand characteristics are always a concern, coauthor PK, who taught the course, was not responsible for the inclusion of the social affiliation measures and personally had no strong hypotheses about the direction of the effect (social affiliation measures were proposed by coauthor LY). Despite this, we take a more direct approach to combatting demand characteristics in Study 2, testing whether results depend on the inclusion of data from PK's classes.

**Dependent measures.** Questions related to social affiliation were asked on a single page. Students read a brief introduction: "Suppose you met someone belonging to a group that had carried out at least one terrorist attack," and were then asked: "How much would you like this person?" ["liking"]; "How similar would you be to this person?" ["similarity"]; "How much would you get along with this person?" ["getting along"]; and "How much would you like to interact with this person?" ["interaction"] (1 – "not at all"; 7 – "very much"). This set of four questions formed our measure of social affiliation, provided that the questions were not differentially affected by treatment.

These questions showed good reliability ( $\alpha_{Pre} = .78$ ;  $\alpha_{Post} = .77$ ); however, we opted not to combine them into a scale in our analysis of treatment below. Our data were hierarchical (e.g. multiple observations from each student; students were clustered within classes), meaning that there was no simple way to model each observation as independent from all others. Instead, we adopted a mixed effects approach, which allowed us to respect this hierarchical design while also allowing that relationships among variables may not be uniform across levels of the design. In particular, because students provided four responses (at pre-treatment and at post-treatment), we could allow that pre-class social affiliation may predict post-class social affiliation differently for each student (see Statistical Methods and Random Effects structure below for more detail).

***Covariates of Interest.*** Students were asked to rate: (a) their knowledge and (b) interest regarding terrorism (“*knowledge*” and “*interest*”; 1 – “I have no knowledge of/interest in the topic”; 7 – “I have a tremendous amount of knowledge about/interest in the topic”); (c) the likelihood that they would change their opinions on terrorism (“*openness to change*”; 1 – “very unlikely”; 7 – “very likely”); and (d) the confidence they had in their opinions (“*confidence*”; 1 – “not confident at all”; 7 – “extremely confident”). At the end of the survey students completed a brief demographics form.

**Statistical methods.** Not all samples collected were independent. Data were collected across two semesters (Fall, 2013; Spring, 2015), meaning that groups of students could be subject to cohort effects; likewise, each student provided multiple measures of social affiliation. To address this, most analyses in this paper use linear mixed effects analyses (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & Baayen, 2015; Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012), also commonly referred to as hierarchical

linear modeling. This technique allows us to model and test the significance of dependencies within our sample—such as cohort effects, or the non-independence of multiple data points from each student—and control for them when necessary. When dependencies were a non-significant source of variance, they were removed from the model to avoid overfitting, as per recent recommendations (Bates et al., 2015). We began with a full factorial model of our random effects structure and winnowed it to a parsimonious model using log-likelihood ratio tests, before testing for fixed effects of interest. The parsimonious model is reported below, and necessary tests to derive it are reported in supplemental materials (Table S1). We performed mixed effects analyses using R (R Core Team, 2015) and the *lme4* package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015), and obtained  $p$  values for fixed effects using the Kenward-Roger approximation of degrees of freedom, implemented in *lmerTest* (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015) and *pbkrtest* packages (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). Following recent recommendations (Cummings, 2014), for key results, we report bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (5000 resamples) in square brackets using the bias corrected and accelerated method (BCa, Efron, 1987). We also use Welch’s unequal variance t-tests, in lieu of traditional student’s t-tests, to avoid imposing the assumption that variance is perfectly equal between groups (Moser & Stevens, 1992). Note that our results report non-integer degrees of freedom; for mixed effects analyses this reflects corrections for the non-independence of observations, and for Welch’s t-tests this reflects corrections for unequal variance between groups.

## Results

**Pre-test scores.** As-if randomization placed students into treatment and wait-list (control) groups; however, it remained possible that the groups may differ on pre-class measures. The groups did not differ on any attitudinal measures: “liking”,  $t(30.9) = 1.33$ ,  $p = .194$ ; “similarity”,  $t(42.8) = 0.20$ ,  $p = .843$ ; “getting along”,  $t(39.4) = 0.60$ ,  $p = 0.550$ ; “interaction”,  $t(41.3) = 0.46$ ,  $p = -.646$ . Scores were generally low for all pre-class attitudinal measures— $M_{\text{Pre-liking}} = 1.79$ ;  $M_{\text{Pre-similarity}} = 2.32$ ;  $M_{\text{Pre-getting along}} = 1.93$ ;  $M_{\text{Pre-interaction}} = 2.79$ —and were all significantly below the scale mid-point: “liking”,  $t(56) = 15.93$ ,  $p < .001$ ; “similarity”,  $t(56) = 9.06$ ,  $p < .001$ ; “getting along”,  $t(56) = 14.21$ ,  $p < .001$ ; “interaction”,  $t(56) = 4.42$ ,  $p < .001$ . Thus, at the beginning of the semester, attitudes were low, and equal between treatment and control groups. We also conducted combined placebo tests, using the random effects structure described below for “Effect of Treatment”. There was no interaction between Treatment and Question,  $F(3, 165.0) = 0.24$ ,  $p = .868$ , so the parameter was removed from our model. In the resulting model, Treatment and Control groups did not differ on the combined measure of pre-class social affiliation,  $b = -0.23$ ,  $t(54.9) = 0.73$ ,  $p = .467$ .

We compared treatment and wait-list groups on a number of additional covariates: “openness to change”,  $t(51.6) = 0.37$ ,  $p = .711$ ; “interest”,  $t(40.5) = 0.66$ ,  $p = .514$ ; “confidence”,  $t(40.7) = 1.03$ ,  $p = .307$ ; and “knowledge”,  $t(49.0) = 0.78$ ,  $p = .437$ . We also compared treatment and wait-list groups on demographic measures: political orientation (1–“very liberal”; 7–“very conservative”),  $t(41.9) = 1.10$ ,  $p = .277$ ; gender (male = 0; female = 1),  $t(39.5) = 1.53$ ,  $p = .135$ ; and age,  $t(25.8) = 1.86$ ,  $p = .075$ . The marginal difference in age uncovered one potential limitation of our as-if randomization procedure—although course registration times are randomized within each student year,

they are not randomized across them; college seniors are given priority above juniors, sophomores and freshman in registration, meaning that our treatment group is biased to contain more senior students ( $M_{\text{Age:Treatment}} = 21.49$ ;  $SD_{\text{Age:Treatment}} = 0.66$ ;  $M_{\text{Age:Wait-list}} = 21.0$ ;  $SD_{\text{Age:Wait-list}} = 1.19$ ). Given this, we report whether key results below are affected by the inclusion of student year as a covariate.

**Random effects structure.** Before testing fixed effects (e.g. Treatment), we created a random effects structure, also commonly called a hierarchical linear model (Baayen et al., 2008). Each data point was nested within several levels—e.g., student, semester—and by modeling each, when necessary, we could produce accurate estimates of effects that also generalize to a sampled population (e.g. to a population of university students). Effects may also vary across these levels; for instance, pre-class attitudes may predict post-class attitudes better for some students more than for others. Working backwards from a maximal model (Bates et al., 2015; Table S1), we arrived at the following parsimonious model:

$$\text{Attitude}_{\text{Post}} = 1 + (0 + \text{Attitude}_{\text{Pre}} \mid \text{Semester}) + (1 + \text{Attitude}_{\text{Pre}} \mid \text{Student})$$

Within our sample, there was significant variability in: (a) the by-semester relationship between pre-class and post-class social affiliation, ( $\text{Attitude}_{\text{Pre}} \mid \text{Semester}$ ),  $\chi^2(1) = 18.56$ ,  $p < .001$ ; (b) the by-student relationship between pre-class and post-class social affiliation, ( $\text{Attitude}_{\text{Pre}} \mid \text{Student}$ ),  $\chi^2(1) = 7.62$ ,  $p = .006$ ; and (c) by-student mean post-class social affiliation, ( $1 \mid \text{Student}$ ),  $\chi^2(1) = 27.57$ ,  $p < .001$ . Thus, our model allows that the relationship between pre-class and post-class social affiliation differs for each semester and student, and that mean post-class social affiliation differs for each student.

**Effect of treatment.** We added fixed effects of interest to the random effects structure described above. First, we examined whether treatment differentially affected our four measures of post-class social affiliation (“liking”, “getting along”, “similarity”, “interaction”); the interaction between treatment and question was non-significant,  $F(3, 154.0) = 1.37, p = .254$ , and so social affiliation was defined as the combination of the four attitudinal measures. With the interaction term removed, there was a main effect of question,  $F(3, 157.6) = 4.38, p = .005$ , where some questions received higher ratings than others; however, critically, there was a main effect of Treatment, where treatment students reported higher post-class social affiliation toward terrorists than wait-listed students,  $F(1, 52.5) = 7.59, p = .008, b = .70, [0.21, 1.19]$  (Figure 1; Table S2). The main effect of treatment remained significant after controlling for student year,  $F(1, 52.8) = 5.31, p = .025, b = .76, [0.13, 1.43]$ . Thus, treatment students, relative to wait-listed students, reported having less extreme negative attitudes toward terrorists at the end of the semester.

Note that this effect of treatment did not depend on the specification of our random effects structure. In an ordinary least squares regression, predicting the average of our four post-class social affiliation measures ( $\alpha = .77$ ), and including average pre-class social affiliation ( $\alpha = .78$ ), and student class year (freshman / sophomore / junior / senior / graduate) as covariates, the effect of treatment remained significant,  $t(49) = 2.83, p = .007, b = .87, [0.25, 1.49]$ .




Figure 1. Study 1 main effect of treatment. 95% confidence interval computed using BCa method (Efron, 1987; 5000 resamples). The scale mid-point for post-class social affiliation is marked with a dotted line. Percent increase represents the estimate for the treatment group relative to the wait-list group. Error bars represent standard error of the treatment coefficient.

**Potential moderators.** It was possible that treatment might affect some students more strongly than others. As we had collected several measures of individual differences, we explored the interaction between treatment and pre-class measures of (a), knowledge, (b) interest, and (c) opinion confidence. In no case was the interaction with treatment significant,  $ps > .350$  (Table S3). Thus, there were no obvious individual differences accounting for the effect of treatment—at the end of the semester, students who completed a course on terrorism, compared to those who were wait-listed, reported having less extreme negative attitudes toward terrorists.

**Potential confirmation bias.** Several covariates were of additional interest because they may reflect confirmation bias on the part of students. Treatment may be less

effective for students who: (a) initially reported extreme hostility toward terrorists (i.e. students with low pre-class social affiliation), (b) initially reported being unwilling to change their minds about terrorists (i.e. low pre-class openness to change), or (c) were more politically conservative. None of these covariates interacted with treatment,  $ps > .280$  (Table S4). Thus, in our sample, there was no evidence that treatment was affected by confirmation biases.

## **Discussion**

Study 1 provided causal evidence (through as-if randomization) that participation in a course on terrorism improved students' initial (strongly negative) attitudes toward terrorists. This was surprising, as the course was not intended to teach students tolerance—the survey itself was part of an ongoing project to study politically relevant attitudes surrounding terrorism, and given this, coauthor PK had no explicit aim to reduce prejudice (for an example of the course readings in Study 1, see Appendix A). To ensure that the observed effects were not specific to PK's class, Study 2 aimed to replicate the effect within a larger sample, spanning professors, classes, and universities. Collecting a larger and more diverse sample also provided an opportunity to revisit the potential moderation of treatment by individual differences.

## **Study 2**

Study 2 surveyed students at 31 classes, taught by 16 professors, at 11 universities across the United States. As-if randomization was not possible in this case; instead, treatment classes (classes teaching about terrorism; e.g. “Causes of Terrorism and Political Violence”; “Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats to the Homeland”) were compared with control classes (classes covering topics only indirectly

related to terrorism; e.g. “Causes of War”; “Theories of Peace and Conflict”). We were interested in whether the main effect of treatment would replicate within this more diverse sample.

## Methods

**Participants.** Three hundred seventy-seven students ( $M_{\text{Age}} = 22.0$ ,  $SD_{\text{Age}} = 4.9$ ; 189 female, 12 unspecified, 176 male; for full crosstabs see Tables 2-3) completed a pre-class and post-class survey, as described in Study 1. Students were recruited from classes across the United States over a period of two years ( $N_{\text{Classes}} = 31$ ;  $N_{\text{Professors}} = 16$ ;  $N_{\text{Universities}} = 11$ ;  $N_{\text{Semesters}} = 4$ ). We compared classes teaching about terrorism (*treatment*;  $N_{\text{Students: Treatment}} = 249$ ;  $N_{\text{Classes: Treatment}} = 20$ ; Table 2), with classes covering topics only indirectly related to terrorism (*control*;  $N_{\text{Students: Control}} = 128$ ;  $N_{\text{Classes: Control}} = 11$ ; Table 3).

To collect as many treatment and control classes as possible, we solicited professors to participate and included all who responded, categorizing each as treatment or control based on syllabus content. Coauthor PK and three other professors taught classes at Boston College. Other classes were taught by professors who responded to a request for participants, circulated through the START (Study of Terrorism and the Prevention of Terrorism) professional listserv. Some of these professors were currently teaching courses related to terrorism, and some were currently teaching other courses, creating a natural control group of professors who were knowledgeable about terrorism but not currently teaching it. Control classes at Boston College were selected to cover material in related subfields that excluded terrorism (i.e. international relations, security). Classes in which terrorism was studied for over three weeks were coded as treatment; otherwise classes were coded as control.

All classes were taught within political science, history, and international studies departments. No classes were taught within psychology departments or by psychology professors, and only one class included psychological readings related to prejudice reduction (“Psychology of Political Violence and Terrorism”; 7 students, comprising 1.9% of our total sample). Classes were generally small (28 of 30 classes had fewer than 36 students), and conducted as lecture-discussions. Treatment classes focused on topics like the causes, strategies, and effects of terrorism, whereas control classes focused on topics like the causes of war, crisis communication, and the politics of intelligence.

Thirteen students completed the survey in more than one class; entries beyond their first were excluded, and if two entries occurred within the same semester then only the treatment entry was retained. Within each class, after the pre-class and post-class survey, five participating students were randomly awarded \$10 Amazon.com gift cards—except at Georgia Tech, where a state ban prohibits gambling via random incentives, so all students received \$20 gift cards for completing both surveys. Professors (with the exception of coauthor PK) who completed the survey received a \$50 Amazon.com gift card. Institutional review board approval was obtained from each school, and informed consent was obtained from all participants.

The average response rate in Study 2 (52.4%) was lower than that reported in Study 1 (95.1%). This was not unexpected, as students would almost certainly be less motivated to complete a survey for a professor they do not know personally. Detailed comparisons between full and drop-off respondents were precluded, as informed consent was collected with the post-class survey (to avoid alerting students to the purpose of the survey). Critical for us however, there were no differences in response rate across classes

between the treatment and control group—Welch’s unequal variance t-test,  $t(25.8) = 0.26, p = .796$ . Likewise, there were no differences in class size between the treatment and control group— Welch’s unequal variance t-test,  $t(28.8) = 0.40, p = .691$ . Thus, although a higher response rate would be desirable, our treatment and control groups were well matched.

**Procedure and Measures.** Pre-class and post-class surveys were identical to those described in Study 1. Once again, measures of social affiliation (“liking”, “similarity”, “getting along”, and “interaction”) showed good reliability ( $\alpha_{Pre} = .78$ ;  $\alpha_{Post} = .79$ ), and again, we opted to avoid combing them into a scale in most analyses, favoring a mixed effects approach to estimate by-subject random slopes and intercepts (see Statistical Methods and Random Effects structure below for more detail).

**Statistical Analysis.** As in Study 1, not all samples were independent: data could potentially be clustered within students, professors, classes, universities, and semesters. Linear mixed effects analyses allowed us to examine effects while controlling for this variability when necessary (Baayen et al., 2008; Bates et al., 2015; Judd et al., 2012). Once again, we began with a full factorial model of our random effects structure, and winnowed it to a parsimonious model before testing fixed effects of interest (Table S5). For key results, we also report bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in square brackets (5000 resamples; BCa, Efron, 1987). Non-integer degrees of freedom reflect corrections for the non-independence of observations in mixed effects analyses, and for corrections based on unequal variance between groups in Welch’s t-tests.

Table 2. Study 2 treatment classes, response rates and demographics.

School	Professor	Class Name	Semester	Enrollment	Responses	Gender	Age	Political Orientation	
American University	Prof A	Causes of Terrorism and Political Violence	Fall, 2013	25	17	6 female 11 male	$M = 20.3$ $SD = 0.9$	$M = 4.1$ $SD = 1.5$	
	Prof B	Psychology of Political Violence and Terrorism	Fall, 2014	23	7	2 female 5 male	$M = 23.3$ $SD = 1.8$	$M = 3.9$ $SD = 1.2$	
American Military University	Prof C	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats to the Homeland	Fall, 2013	22	2	1 female 1 male	$M = 27.5$ $SD = 0.7$	$M = 5$ $SD = 1.4$	
		Senior Seminar in Homeland Security	Fall, 2013	13	3	3 male	$M = 38$ $SD = 11.3$	$M = 5.3$ $SD = 1.2$	
		Introduction to Homeland Security and Defense	Fall, 2014	13	1	Omitted to protect anonymity.			
Boston College	Prof D	The History of Terrorism	Fall, 2014	75	56	29 female 26 male 1 unspecified	$M = 20.5$ $SD = 0.7$	$M = 3.3$ $SD = 1.3$	
						Prof E			Terror and the American Century
	P. Krause	Terrorism, Insurgency, and Political Violence		Fall, 2013	17	17	9 female 8 male	$M = 21.1$ $SD = 0.8$	$M = 3.7$ $SD = 1.4$
				Spring, 2014	13	11	6 female 5 male	$M = 21.4$ $SD = 3.3$	$M = 2.8$ $SD = 1.3$
				Spring, 2015	18	18 (including 4 repeats)	11 female 3 male	$M = 21.6$ $SD = 0.5$	$M = 2.9$ $SD = 1.4$
		Introduction to International Studies	Spring, 2014	32	15	5 female 10 male	$M = 19.3$ $SD = 0.5$	$M = 3.5$ $SD = 1.7$	
		International Studies Senior Seminar	Spring, 2014	12	12 (including 2 repeats)	6 female 4 male	$M = 21.1$ $SD = 0.6$	$M = 2.9$ $SD = 1.4$	

Excelsior College	Prof F	International Terrorism	Fall, 2013	7	2	0 female 2 male	$M = 42$ $SD = 2.8$	$M = 5.5$ $SD = 0.7$
Georgia Institute of Technology	Prof G	The Challenges of Terrorism	Fall, 2014	23	12	4 female 7 male	$M = 21.7$ $SD = 2.3$	$M = 3.1$ $SD = 1.2$
Northeastern University	Prof H	Terrorism, Violence, and Politics	Spring, 2014	22	11	6 female 5 male	$M = 29.1$ $SD = 12.6$	$M = 3.9$ $SD = 0.9$
University of Denver	Prof I	International Terrorism	Spring, 2014	15	13	6 female 1 unspecified 6 male	$M = 27.3$ $SD = 4.6$	$M = 4.2$ $SD = 1.5$
University of Maryland	Prof J	Asymmetric Warfare	Fall, 2013	58	28	6 female 2 unspecified 20 male	$M = 22.4$ $SD = 3.9$	$M = 3.7$ $SD = 1.6$
	Prof K	Motivations and Intents of Terrorists and Terrorist Groups	Fall, 2014	10	6	1 female 5 male	$M = 29.2$ $SD = 7.0$	$M = 2.5$ $SD = 1.0$
Westwood College	Prof L	Terrorism (Class 1)	Spring, 2014	23	5	0 female 4 unspecified 1 male	$M = 22.8$ $SD = 2.8$	$M = 2.8$ $SD = 1.3$
		Terrorism (Class 2)	Spring, 2014	23	7	4 female 3 male	$M = 23.6$ $SD = 5.4$	$M = 3.1$ $SD = 1.2$

Political Orientation was measured on a 7-point scale (1 - very liberal; 7 – very conservative).

Table 3. Study 2 control classes, response rates and demographics.

School	Professor	Class Name	Semester	Enrollment	Responses	Gender	Age	Political Orientation
American University	Prof A	U.S. National Security and Civil Wars	Fall, 2014	13	6	2 female 4 male	$M = 28$ $SD = 4.0$	$M = 2.5$ $SD = 1.0$
			Boston College	Prof M	Causes of War	Fall, 2013	35	11
Boston College	Prof M	Causes of War	Fall, 2014	29	6	3 female 3 male	$M = 20.8$ $SD = 1.0$	$M = 2.3$ $SD = 0.8$
			Intelligence and International Security	Fall, 2013	36	14 (including 2 repeats)	9 female 3 male	$M = 21.2$ $SD = 0.4$
		Modern Classics of International Relations	Fall, 2014	9	3	1 female 2 male	$M = 20.3$ $SD = 0.6$	$M = 3.3$ $SD = 2.3$
		United Nations and International Security	Fall, 2014	36	14 (including 1 repeat)	6 female 1 unspecified 6 male	$M = 21.1$ $SD = 0.9$	$M = 3.2$ $SD = 0.8$
		P. Krause	Research Methods and National Movements	Spring, 2014	16	14 (including 4 repeats)	6 female 4 male	$M = 20.5$ $SD = 1.3$
University at Albany, SUNY	Prof N	Honors Course on Political Violence	Fall, 2013	23	17	13 female 2 unspecified 2 male	$M = 18.6$ $SD = 0.8$	$M = 3.2$ $SD = 1.4$
		Honors Course on Political Violence	Fall, 2014	25	21	16 female 5 male	$M = 20.9$ $SD = 7.0$	$M = 3.3$ $SD = 1.5$
University of Maryland	Prof O	Crisis Communication	Fall, 2013	33	13	11 female 2 male	$M = 21.2$ $SD = 1.3$	$M = 3.2$ $SD = 1.7$
Washington College	Prof J	Theories of Peace and Conflict	Fall, 2014	25	16	10 female 6 male	$M = 21.1$ $SD = 3.6$	$M = 3.4$ $SD = 1.4$

Political Orientation was measured on a 7-point scale (1 - very liberal; 7 – very conservative).

## Results

**Pre-test scores.** While we aimed to collect a representative control group, it remained possible that it might differ from treatment on pre-class measures. There were no group differences for measures of social affiliation: “liking”,  $t(201.7) = 1.54, p = .125$ ; “similarity”,  $t(224.8) = 0.60, p = .547$ , “getting along”,  $t(227.7) = 0.95, p = .343$ , “interaction”,  $t(244.8) = 0.63, p = .527$ . As in Study 1, pre-class attitudes were low for all measures— $M_{\text{Pre-liking}} = 1.71$ ;  $M_{\text{Pre-similarity}} = 2.17$ ;  $M_{\text{Pre-getting along}} = 1.90$ ;  $M_{\text{Pre-interaction}} = 2.50$ —and were all significantly below the scale midpoint: “liking”,  $t(360) = 43.68, p < .001$ ; “similarity”,  $t(361) = 27.58, p < .001$ ; “getting along”,  $t(358) = 35.41, p < .001$ ; “interaction”,  $t(361) = 15.6, p < .001$ . We also conducted combined placebo tests, using the random effects structure described below for “Effect of Treatment”. There was no interaction between Treatment and Question,  $F(3, 1070.8) = 0.15, p = .929$ , so the parameter was removed from our model. In the resulting model, Treatment and Control groups did not differ on the combined measure of pre-class social affiliation,  $b = -0.15, t(326.0) = 1.21, p = .226$ . Thus, both treatment and control groups began the semester with the same strong negative attitudes toward terrorists.

We compared treatment and control groups on the remaining pre-test covariates. Groups did not differ in “openness to change”,  $t(236.8) = 1.00, p = .319$ , “knowledge”,  $t(216.6) = 0.94, p = .348$ , or “confidence”,  $t(246.2) = 1.02, p = .308$ . Across groups, there were significant differences in “interest”,  $t(266.1) = 4.86, p < .001$ , which was expected given that treatment students chose to be in the course on terrorism. There were also differences in gender,  $t(261.2) = 3.93, p < .001$ , and age,  $t(339.3) = 3.45, p < .001$ , and a marginal difference in political orientation,  $t(248.2) = 1.78, p = .076$ , such that treatment

students were more likely to be younger, female, and (marginally more) liberal. Given this, below we report final models that include age, gender, political orientation, and “interest” as covariates, to ensure that key effects remain significant after controlling for these pre-existing differences.

**Random effects structure.** As in Study 1, we created our random effects structure by beginning with a maximal model and working backwards to remove non-significant random-effects components (Bates et al., 2015; Table S5). We arrived at the following model:

$$\text{Attitude}_{\text{Post}} = 1 + (0 + \text{Attitude}_{\text{Pre}} \mid \text{Semester}) + (1 + \text{Attitude}_{\text{Pre}} \mid \text{Student}) + (1 \mid \text{Professor})$$

Within our sample, there was significant variability in: (a) the by-semester relationship between pre-class and post-class social affiliation ( $\text{Attitude}_{\text{Pre}} \mid \text{Semester}$ ),  $\chi^2(1) = 133.7$ ,  $p < .001$ ; (b) the by-student relationship between pre-class and post-class social affiliation, ( $\text{Attitude}_{\text{Pre}} \mid \text{Student}$ ),  $\chi^2(1) = 57.8$ ,  $p < .001$ ; (c) by-student mean post-class social affiliation,  $\chi^2(1) = 166.6$ ,  $p < .001$ ; and (d) by-professor mean post-class social affiliation, ( $1 \mid \text{Professor}$ ),  $\chi^2(1) = 14.5$ ,  $p < .001$ . Thus, our model allows that the relationship between pre-class and post-class social affiliation differs for each semester and student, and that mean post-class social affiliation differs for each student, and group of students taught by a professor.

Sources of variability in this model were the same as in Study 1, with the addition of the final term—(d) by-professor random-intercepts, which was not strictly necessary for our purposes. The aim of Study 2 was to replicate Study 1 in a more diverse sample, that is, it tested the claim that: treatment is generalizable beyond a sample of students,

*within* a novel sample of professors. Controlling for by-professor random-intercepts actually tested an even stronger claim: that treatment is generalizable beyond a sample of students and *beyond* a sample of professors. While the prospect of this outcome was exciting, it was also unlikely that our sample of only 16 professors would allow for this level of generalization. Thus, analyses of treatment including by-professor random intercepts are reported in supplemental materials (Table S6), and the following random effects structure was used in analyses below:

$$\text{Attitude}_{\text{Post}} = 1 + (0 + \text{Attitude}_{\text{Pre}} \mid \text{Semester}) + (1 + \text{Attitude}_{\text{Pre}} \mid \text{Student})$$

**Effect of treatment.** We added fixed effects of interest to the random effects structure described above. Fixed effects included treatment, question (“liking”, “similarity”, “getting along”, “interaction”), and pre-class social affiliation (to control for any relationship not already captured by random effects). There was no interaction between treatment and question,  $F(3, 972.3) = 1.75, p = .154$ . With the interaction term removed, there was a main effect of question,  $F(3, 972.1) = 10.9, p < .001$ , and critically, a main effect of treatment,  $F(1, 328.8) = 9.00, p = .003, b = 0.34, [0.12, 0.55]$  (Figure 2). To ensure that these results did not depend on the inclusion of coauthor PK, we removed his students from the sample (77 students, 20.4% of the total sample); the effect of treatment remained significant,  $F(1, 251.11) = 4.89, p = .028, b = 0.27, [0.03, 0.50]$ . Still excluding students taught by PK, treatment remained significant after controlling for age, gender, political orientation, and pre-class interest,  $F(1, 239.7) = 3.92, p = 0.049, b = 0.26, [0.01, 0.52]$ . Thus, the effect of treatment observed in Study 1 was successfully replicated in a novel sample of professors.

Once again, our effect of treatment did not depend on the specification of our random effects structure. In an ordinary least squares regression, predicting the average

of our four post-class social affiliation measures ( $\alpha = .79$ ) and including treatment and pre-class social affiliation ( $\alpha = .78$ ) as predictors, the effect of treatment was significant,  $b = 0.32$ ,  $t(334) = 2.93$ ,  $p = .004$ . When school was added as a fixed effect (to control for differences in the probability of assignment to treatment/control), treatment remained significant,  $b = 0.29$ ,  $t(324) = 2.11$ ,  $p = .036$ . Thus, the effect of treatment was not dependent on our specifying a random effects model.




Figure 2. Study 2 main effect of treatment. Treatment remained significant after excluding students taught by coauthor PK (20.4 % of total sample),  $b = 0.27$ ,  $[0.03, 0.50]$ ,  $p = .028$ . The scale mid-point for post-class social affiliation is marked with a dotted line. 95% confidence interval computed using the BCa method (Efron, 1987; 5000 resamples). Percent increase represents the treatment rating relative to the wait-list group. Error bars represent standard error of the treatment coefficient.

**Potential moderators.** As in Study 1, we explored whether individual differences moderated the effect of treatment, making it more or less effective. We explored

interactions between treatment and pre-class measures of a) knowledge and (b) opinion confidence. Interactions were non-significant  $ps > .71$ , (Table S7).

**Potential confirmation bias.** As in Study 1, we expected that some individual differences might reduce our treatment's effectiveness based on confirmation bias: (a) students' pre-class openness to change; (b) students' and professors' pre-class social affiliation; and (c) students' and professors' political conservatism. None of these covariates interacted with treatment,  $ps > .245$  (Table S8). Thus, as in Study 1, confirmation biases neither interfered with, nor accounted for, the effectiveness of treatment.

### General Discussion

Some of the most prominent terrorist groups today welcome hatred from opposing states and citizens as a means of provoking indiscriminate retaliation against their own communities (Kydd & Walter, 2006; Lake, 2002). This indiscriminate retaliation is at best ineffective, and at worst counterproductive (Cronin, 2009); it runs counter to the most effective counterterrorism policies, which stem from understanding terrorists as rational agents, acting in pursuit of political goals. Hatred of terrorists, in either policymakers or the citizens that elect them, is an obstacle for effective counterterrorism strategies. Education, as a prejudice reduction technique is well suited to reducing this hatred in this context. The present work tested whether students' initial extreme negative attitudes toward terrorists became less negative after they completed a college course on the topic (*treatment*). Studies of education-based methods for prejudice reduction rarely allow for causal inference (Paluck & Greene, 2009), making the use of as-if randomization in Study 1 a particular strength of the present work. Study 1 demonstrated

that education about terrorists increased students' social affiliation toward them: students became more willing to say they would "like," "get along with," were "similar to," and would "interact with," "someone belonging to a group that had carried out at least one terrorist attack" (Figure 1). Study 2 replicated the effect within a sample of treatment and control classes drawn from 31 classes, taught by 16 professors, at 11 United States universities (Figure 2). Students' attitudes did not become positive in either study (in Figures 1 & 2, means and error bars are nowhere near the scale mid-point); we consider this ideal—after treatment, students do not think positively of terrorists, but critically, they no longer hate them as they once did.

People are known to have a confirmation bias; they selectively attend to and remember information that reinforces their existing beliefs (Ghvirtsman et al., 2016; Haidt, 2001; Kuhn, 1991; Kunda, 1990; Wason, 1960). We initially hypothesized that treatment would be influenced by the confirmation biases of either students (as measured by their initial attitudes, their political orientations, or their self-reported willingness to learn) or professors (as measured by professors' political orientations or social affiliation toward terrorists). However, we found no evidence that confirmation biases affected treatment.

But, presumably, both students and professors do have confirmation biases—they are a well-established effect in social psychology (Haidt, 2001; Kuhn, 1991; Kunda, 1990; Wason, 1960). It is reasonable to assume that if confirmation biases could have exerted an influence then they would have, and their absence may assist speculation about the psychological mechanisms responsible for reducing prejudice. One possibility is that the effectiveness of treatment stems from general, rather than specific, knowledge;

that is, if there were some specific piece of knowledge, some silver bullet, that could have changed a student's mind about terrorists, then he or she could have chosen to ignore it, or the professor could have neglected to teach it. By contrast, if the effectiveness of treatment depends on general knowledge, then it should be more difficult for confirmation biases to exert an effect—there is no specific piece of information that students (or professors) could either ignore or latch on to. Consistent with this, all our measures of social affiliation (e.g. “liking”) asked students about a generic terrorist, as opposed to an individual from a particular group (e.g., ISIL, the IRA). If we had asked about a particular group then treatment might depend on specific knowledge about that group, such as the historical or social circumstances that motivated their attack.

But how exactly did education increase students' social affiliation toward terrorists? While prior work has reduced prejudice by providing positive examples of stigmatized outgroups or of intergroup interactions (e.g. Gurin et al., 1999), given that classes (particularly Study 1; see Appendix A) focused on counterterrorism and the causes, objectives, and methods of terrorism, it is less likely that positive information about terrorists was responsible for our effect. Professors taught their students about terrorism—they were not explicitly interested in fostering students' pro-social attitudes. Given that most students did not receive positive information about terrorists, is it possible that neutral information alone could dilute a strong initial prejudice?

Associative research provides a psychological framework that could account for this effect (Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, & Mellott, 2002). In this framework, activating one concept calls associated concepts to mind, which are (to varying extents) positively or negatively valenced. At the beginning of the semester,

students knew relatively little about terrorism; that is, the concept “terrorism” only possessed a small set of associative links to (mostly negative) related concepts—e.g., Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, ISIL, foreigners (Tuman, 2010). Thus, when “terrorism” was called to mind, only these few negative associations came to mind with it. Treatment classes, in our study, did not attempt to remove these initial negative associations, but they may have flooded the concept “terrorism” with new associative links (e.g. IRA, Weather Underground, specific political objectives of terrorist groups). Through learning about terrorism, students may come to associate it with so much that its strong pejorative connotations—the initial links—are diluted amongst the new associations they have learned.

This mechanism, if confirmed in future work, would be promising for other anti-prejudice interventions, particularly as an alternative to methods that focus exclusively on positive counterexamples, where treatment can suffer from issues related to subtyping: positive counterexamples are represented as distinct from the more general category, and thus fail to reduce prejudice (Greenwald et al., 2002; Weber & Crocker, 1983). Theoretically, our proposed mechanism—diluting pejorative links among new associations—should be less likely to risk sub-typing, as the central concept is not pressured by opposite positively and negatively valenced associations. Instead, the intervention may avoid putting pressure on the concept “terrorism” to split, and it may do this by using new associations that do not have a strong valence themselves (i.e. general knowledge about terrorism). This finding is consistent with Salomon’s (2004) interpretation of the intervention in Lustig (2002), where Israeli students studied external conflicts, as opposed to their own. As in their intervention, the present work may allow

students to learn about the nature of terrorism in less immediate and emotionally charged contexts. Consistent with this, Salomon notes that learning in this way could circumvent defenses, such as entrenchment in existing beliefs—an outcome we also observed in the present work.

### **Limitations and Extensions**

While we favor this psychological explanation, we allow that other mechanisms may also account for the effect of treatment. One possibility is that students learn to challenge whether the label “terrorist” is properly applied, treating the term as no more or less pejorative, but questioning whether its use is justified, or what its use actually tells them about the targeted group. “Terrorist” is a nebulous term, and while its public usage carries a clear negative connotation, its professional use is vigorously debated, to the point that the formal definition varies even across government departments within the United States (Hoffman, 2009). At the beginning of the semester, when students were told that an individual’s group had committed a terrorist attack, they may have seen very little ambiguity in the statement; at the end of the semester they might ask: what was the attack (e.g., what did it target, what were the aims), and who declared it a terrorist attack? In its public usage, to apply the label “terrorist” is to implicitly make a moral judgment (Jenkins, 1985). In its professional usage, which students may have become familiar with, it becomes valid to ask whether the label is being properly applied—does this group fit the objective features that define terrorism? As students are exposed to a broader

academic understanding of terrorism, they may become less likely to blindly accept that all usage of the term is appropriate\*.

While the implications of this explanation may be more specific to terrorism, rather than to anti-prejudice research more generally, its importance should not be understated. Politicians have, at times, silenced meaningful debate by labeling their opponents “terrorists,” and students may now see through this rhetorical strategy. Leaders in Syria and Egypt today apply the label to much of their political opposition as a means of justifying increased executive powers and repressive policies (Black, 2012; “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Declared ‘Terrorist Group’ ”, 2013); in the post-9/11 United States, accused foreign terrorists can be held indefinitely without trial, (de Nies, 2011), while extreme environmentalists who committed arson can be labeled terrorists and sent to maximum security prisons for years (“Arsonists or Terrorists?”, 2011). Indeed, the label of “terrorist” is one of the most powerful rhetorical tools in policy today, as invoking it can shift the treatment of suspects and prisoners, the focus of the media, and government funding and policies from a crime model to a war model (Miller & Gordon, 2014). Thus,

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\* Note that this explanation speaks to students’ knowledge of the term “terrorism”, and their avoiding a blind acceptance of it as necessarily pejorative. Alternatively, the effect could depend on which terrorist group students assumed to stand in for “a group that had carried out at least one terrorist attack”, in our measures of social affiliation. For instance, knowing few terrorist groups initially, students may think the question must refer to ISIS or Al Qaeda, only to realize post-class that it could refer to many more groups. If this were the case, then students who can name more terrorist groups (particularly Western groups, such as environmental activists) should report more positive attitudes. Although not analyzed above, students were asked to name up to 10 terrorist groups pre- and post-class. Across our full Study 2 sample the post-class number of correct groups was correlated with post-class social affiliation; however, the number of specifically western groups was not. Furthermore, the number of correct groups did not eliminate the effect of treatment when modeled as a covariate (see Supplemental Results). Thus, while this explanation may describe a small component of treatment, it cannot completely account for it.

shifting students' understanding and interpretation of the label could have serious political ramifications. Effectively, learning about terrorism may neuter it as a rhetorical tool to inspire hatred.

We must also acknowledge that our discussion is framed in terms of "hatred", yet we did not explicitly measure hatred of terrorists. The questions that were asked were less emotionally charged: specifically, whether students would "like", "get along with", "interact with", or were "similar to" someone who belongs to a terrorist group. Our concern was that asking students about "hatred" might introduce demand characteristics and prompt students to signal that they have the "correct" attitudes (which might be to denigrate terrorists, or to renounce hate; in either case students would report extremes on our scale and variance would be reduced). While our measures do not specifically ask about "hatred", they are reliable and collectively they can be used to measure positive/negative attitudes. Even after treatment, students' attitudes were significantly below the scale mid-point, suggesting that they maintained their initial negative attitudes, but that these attitudes were also less negative than they were before. Thus, students were hardly ever willing to say that they liked terrorists, but they varied in the strength of their objection to this prompt.

Finally, when we assert that the most effective counterterrorism strategies are based around understanding the enemy, one might object: Couldn't it be just as effective to brutally repress a population, at least until it is incapable of engaging in terrorist attacks? For instance, a major military effort defeated the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka; likewise, Russia has faced several insurgencies and has successfully repressed the majority of them, often through harsh measures such as mass deportation (Engelhardt,

1992). While authoritarian tactics can be effective in some cases, they also carry a number of costs—beyond their moral repugnance—that make them less effective than “democratic” methods (Byman, 2016). Furthermore, these authoritarian methods are generally successful in counterinsurgency campaigns, where insurgents are organized, have strong support from the local community, and are geographically confined. By contrast, counterterrorism efforts must contend with loosely organized and geographically dispersed groups—Paris cannot be bulldozed, or put under martial law, until the threat of terrorism passes. The most proven counterterrorism methods rely on human interaction and communication (Lyall & Wilson, 2009), and we believe that the use of these methods will find more support when terrorists are less hated by the general population.

### **Conclusion**

The threat posed by terrorism is one to be taken seriously. However, the greatest successes in counterterrorism have stemmed from an understanding of terrorists’ personal and political motivations. Given this, hatred toward terrorists is an obstacle; it is actively counterproductive and may even lead to policies that increase attacks (Cronin, 2009). We found that learning about terrorism can decrease the extreme negative reactions it evokes. This suggests that knowing our enemies is an effective step toward defeating them.

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## Supplemental Materials

### Methods

**Unabridged survey description, Studies 1 & 2.** Pre-class and post-class surveys all began by asking students to provide a 1-2 sentence definition of terrorism, to name up to ten terrorist groups that had performed at least one attack, and to rate their knowledge and interest regarding terrorism (“*knowledge*” and “*interest*”; 1 – “I have no knowledge of/interest in the topic”; 7 – “I have a tremendous amount of knowledge about/interest in the topic”). Next, students completed blocks of questions in a random order about: (1) common motives for individuals and groups to engage in terrorism; (2) whether facts related to terrorists and terrorism are true or false; (3) whether terrorism is effective and whether Al-Qaeda had succeeded; (4) the threat of terrorism to the United States and to the student him or herself; (5) the student’s opinions about the efficacy of government counterterrorism policies; and finally, (6) the student’s attitude toward terrorists (i.e. social affiliation). At the end of the survey, students completed a brief demographic questionnaire and rated the likelihood that they would change their opinions on terrorism (“*openness to change*”; 1 – “very unlikely”; 7 – “very likely”) and the confidence they had in their opinions (“*confidence*”; 1 – “not confident at all”; 7 – “extremely confident”).

### Results

**Effect of post-class number of terrorist groups named.** As described above, in pre-class and post-class surveys students were asked to name up to ten terrorist groups that had performed at least one attack. These groups were coded by research assistants (unfamiliar with the study hypotheses) for correctness, whether a group was Islamic or Middle Eastern, whether a group was Western, and whether a group was based in the United States. In our dataset for Study 2, we tested the correlations between these measures and average post-class social affiliation ( $\alpha = .79$ ). Post-class social affiliation was correlated with the number of correct groups,  $r = .208, p < .001$ , and the number Middle Eastern groups,  $r = .159, p = .004$ , but not with the number of Western or American groups (Table S9).

We explored whether either correct groups or Middle Eastern groups interacted with treatment, or eliminated the effect of treatment as a covariate when added to our Study 2 random effects model.

$$\text{Attitude}_{\text{Post}} = 1 + (0 + \text{Attitude}_{\text{Pre}} \mid \text{Semester}) + (1 + \text{Attitude}_{\text{Pre}} \mid \text{Student})$$

Neither interacted with treatment (correct groups\*treatment,  $b = -0.03$ ,  $t(337.9) = 0.74$ ,  $p = .463$ ; Middle East groups\*treatment,  $b = -0.03$ ,  $t(352.2) = 0.60$ ,  $p = .546$ ), and treatment remained significant when both were included as covariates,  $b = 0.289$ ,  $t(341.3) = 2.31$ ,  $p = .022$ .

Table S1. Random effects structure in Study 1.

Model #	Random effects structure	Parameter tested	Log-likelihood ratio
1	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (1 + Treatment + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester)	-	-
2	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (1 + Treatment + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>    Semester) <sup>1</sup>	Parameter correlations within: (1 + Treatment + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester)	$\chi^2(3) = 5.28, p = .152$
3	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Treatment + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>    Semester)	(1   Semester)	$\chi^2(1) = 0, p = 1$
4	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester)	(Treatment   Semester)	$\chi^2(1) = 2.27, p = .132$
<b>Final Model</b>	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester)	(1   Student) (Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) (Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester)	$\chi^2(1) = 27.57, p < .001$ $\chi^2(1) = 7.62, p = .006$ $\chi^2(1) = 18.56, p < .001$

Following recent recommendations (Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & Baayen, 2015), we used log-likelihood ratio tests compare models with, and without a given parameter; correlations within a level were removed to test parameters, but were returned to the final model.

<sup>1</sup> The notation “||” indicates that correlations between parameters are not to be calculated—e.g. (1 + Attitude<sub>pre</sub> || School) indicates that by-school random intercepts, and by-school Attitude<sub>pre</sub> random slopes should be calculated, but not the correlation between them.

Table S2. Effect of treatment in Study 1.

Variable of Interest	Model Specification / Fixed Effects	F test	b [95% CI]
<b>Treatment</b>	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester) <b>Fixed effects:</b> Question + Treatment	Question $F(3, 157.6) = 4.4, p = .005$	Intercept: 2.27, [1.83, 2.7 Interact: 0.30, [-0.06, 0.6 Like: -0.24, [-0.57, 0.1 Similar: 0.32, [-0.02, 0.6 <b>0.70, [0.21, 1.1</b>
		<b>Treatment</b> $F(1, 52.5) = 7.6, p = .008$	
<b>Treatment</b>	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester) + (1   Professor) <b>Fixed effects:</b> Attitude <sub>pre</sub> + Question + Treatment + Student_Year	Question $F(3, 157.6) = 4.7, p = .004$ Student_Year $F(1, 58.7) = 0.71, p = .583$	Intercept: 2.30, [1.86, 2.7 Interact: 0.33, [-0.03, 0.7 Like: -0.23, [-0.57, 0.1 Similar: 0.34, [-0.01, 0.6 Sophomore: -1.74, [-4.24, 0.7 Junior: -1.46, [-3.95, 1.0 Senior: -1.72, [-4.15, 0.7 Graduate: -0.85 [-3.82, 2.2 <b>0.76, [0.13, 1.4</b>
Controlling for student year, which biased randomization into treatment and control groups.		<b>Treatment</b> $F(1, 52.8) = 5.3, p = .025$	

All degrees of freedom calculated using the Kenward-Roger approximation method using *lmerTest* (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015) and *pbkr* packages (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). Confidence intervals are calculated using the bias corrected asymmetry method (bCA; Efron, 1987), with 5000 resamples. All continuous IVs are mean-centered; categorical IVs are dummy coded.

Table S3. Potential moderators in Study 1.

Variable of Interest	Model Specification / Fixed Effect	F test	b [95% CI]	
<b>Treatment *</b> <b>Knowledge<sub>Pre</sub></b>	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Semester) <b>Fixed effects:</b> Question + Treatment * Knowledge <sub>Pre</sub>		Intercept: 2.29, [1.85, 2.74]	
		Question	$F(3, 157.4) = 4.4, p = .005$	Interact: 0.31, [-0.06, 0.67] Like: -0.24, [-0.57, 0.10] Similar: 0.33, [-0.02, 0.67]
		Treatment	$F(1, 51.2) = 6.9, p = .012$	0.68, [0.19, 1.17]
		Knowledge <sub>Pre</sub>	$F(1, 50.3) = 0.48, p = .492$	0.19, [-0.33, 0.71]
		<b>Treatment * Knowledge<sub>Pre</sub></b>	<b><math>F(1, 49.5) = 0.88, p = .351</math></b>	<b>-0.30, [-0.90, 0.30]</b>
<b>Treatment *</b> <b>Interest<sub>Pre</sub></b>	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Semester) <b>Fixed effects:</b> Question + Treatment * Interest <sub>Pre</sub>		Intercept: 2.23, [1.78, 2.68]	
		Question	$F(3, 157.4) = 4.47, p = .005$	Interact: 0.31, [-0.05, 0.68] Like: -0.23, [-0.57, 0.10] Similar: 0.33, [-0.02, 0.67]
		Treatment	$F(1, 49.2) = 7.9, p = .007$	0.73, [0.24, 1.23]
		Interest <sub>Pre</sub>	$F(1, 48.0) = 0.60, p = .441$	0.17, [-0.25, 0.61]
		<b>Treatment * Interest<sub>Pre</sub></b>	<b><math>F(1, 49.3) = 0.29, p = .593</math></b>	<b>-0.16, [-0.74, 0.42]</b>
<b>Treatment *</b> <b>Confidence<sub>Pre</sub></b>	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Semester) <b>Fixed effects:</b> Question + Treatment * Confidence <sub>Pre</sub>		Intercept: 2.29, [1.86, 2.73]	
		Question	$F(3, 150.7) = 3.6, p = .015$	Interact: 0.23, [-0.13, 0.59] Like: -0.25, [-0.58, 0.09] Similar: 0.27, [-0.07, 0.60]
		Treatment	$F(1, 48.7) = 6.6, p = .013$	0.67, [0.18, 1.16]
		Confidence <sub>Post</sub>	$F(1, 43.9) = 0.13, p = .716$	-0.07, [-0.43, 0.29]
		<b>Treatment * Confidence<sub>Pre</sub></b>	<b><math>F(1, 44.3) = 0.19, p = .663</math></b>	<b>0.10, [-0.32, 0.51]</b>

All degrees of freedom calculated using the Kenward-Roger approximation method using *lmerTest* (Kuznetsova et al., 2015) and *pbkr* packages (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). Confidence intervals are calculated using the bias corrected asymmetry method (bCA; Efron, 1987), with 5000 resamples. All continuous Ivs are mean-centered; categorical Ivs are dummy coded.

Table S4. Potential confirmation bias in Study 1.

Variable of Interest	Model Specification / Fixed Effect	F test	b [95% CI]
Treatment * Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Semester) <b>Fixed effects:</b> Question + Treatment * Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>	Question $F(3, 157.1) = 4.3, p = .006$	Intercept: 2.23, [1.78, 2.66] Interact: 0.31, [-0.05, 0.68] Like: -0.23, [-0.56, 0.11] Similar: 0.33, [-0.02, 0.67]
		Treatment $F(1, 52.2) = 8.9, p = .004$	0.76, [0.26, 1.26]
		Attitude <sub>Pre</sub> $F(1, 4.4) = 3.8, p = .115$	0.30, [0.02, 0.60]
	<b>Treatment * Attitude<sub>Pre</sub></b>	<b><math>F(1, 35.0) = 1.2, p = .286</math></b>	<b>0.19, [-0.14, 0.54]</b>
Treatment * Openness to Change Pre	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Semester) <b>Fixed effects:</b> Question + Treatment * Openness to Change <sub>Pre</sub>	Question $F(3, 150.5) = 3.7, p = .014$	Intercept: 2.28, [1.85, 2.71] Interact: 0.24, [-0.12, 0.59] Like: -0.24, [-0.57, 0.09] Similar: 0.28, [-0.06, 0.61]
		Treatment $F(1, 1, 49.0) = 7.3, p = .010$	0.69, [0.21, 1.18]
	Openness to Change <sub>Pre</sub>	$F(1, 46.4) = 0.34, p = .564$	-0.10, [-0.45, 0.24]
	<b>Treatment * Openness to Change<sub>Pre</sub></b>	<b><math>F(1, 47.2) = 0.16, p = .690</math></b>	<b>-0.09, [-0.52, 0.34]</b>
Treatment * Political Orientation	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Semester) <b>Fixed effects:</b> Question + Treatment * Political Orientation	Question $F(3, 150.7) = 3.8, p = .012$	Intercept: 2.29, [1.86, 2.73] Interact: 0.22, [-0.14, 0.58] Like: -0.24, [-0.58, 0.09] Similar: 0.30, [-0.05, 0.64]
1 – “Very Liberal”		Treatment $F(1, 48.6) = 6.7, p = .013$	0.67, [0.18, 1.16]
7 – “Very Conservative”		Political Orientation $F(1, 45.2) = 0.13, p = .719$	0.05, [-0.20, 0.29]
	<b>Treatment * Political Orientation</b>	<b><math>F(1, 45.7) = 0.18, p = .674</math></b>	<b>-0.07, [-0.40, 0.25]</b>

All degrees of freedom calculated using the Kenward-Roger approximation method using *lmerTest* (Kuznetsova et al., 2015) and *pbkr* packages (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). Confidence intervals are calculated using the bias corrected asymmetry method (bCA; Efron, 1987), with 5000 resamples. All continuous Ivs are mean-centered; categorical Ivs are dummy coded.

Table S5. Random effects structure in Study 2.

Model #	Random effects structure	Parameter tested	Log-likelihood ratio
1	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Professor) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Class: Professor) <sup>1</sup> + (1 + Treatment + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   School)	-	-
2	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Professor) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Class: Professor) + (1 + Treatment + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>    School) <sup>2</sup>	Parameter correlations within: (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   School)	$\chi^2(1) = 0, p = 1$
3	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Professor) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Class: Professor) + (1 + Treatment + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester) + (1   School)	(Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   School)	$\chi^2(1) = 0, p = 1$
4	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Professor) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Class: Professor) + (1 + Treatment + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester)	(1   School)	$\chi^2(1) = 0, p = 1$
5	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Professor) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>    Class: Professor) + (1 + Treatment + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester)	Parameter correlations within: (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>    Class: Professor)	$\chi^2(1) = 0.12, p = .724$
6	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Professor) + (1   Class: Professor) + (1 + Treatment + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester)	(Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Class: Professor)	$\chi^2(1) = 0, p = 1$
7	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Professor) + (1 + Treatment + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester)	(1   Class: Professor)	$\chi^2(1) = 0.06, p = .803$
8	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Professor) + (1 + Treatment + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>    Semester)	Parameter correlations within: (1 + Treatment + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester)	$\chi^2(3) = 3.29, p = .349$
9	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Professor) + (0 + Treatment + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>    Semester)	(1   Semester)	$\chi^2(1) = 0, p = 1$
10	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Professor) + (0 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester)	(Treatment   Semester)	$\chi^2(1) = 2.52, p = .113$
11	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>    Professor) + (0 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester)	Parameter correlations within: (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Professor)	$\chi^2(1) = 1.92, p = .165$
12	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (1   Professor) + (0 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester)	(Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Professor)	$\chi^2(1) = 0.08, p = .772$
<b>Final Model</b>	(1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (1   Professor) + (0 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester)	(1   Student) (Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) (1   Professor) (Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester)	$\chi^2(1) = 116.6, p < .001$ $\chi^2(1) = 57.8, p < .001$ $\chi^2(1) = 14.5, p < .001$ $\chi^2(1) = 113.7, p < .001$

Log-likelihood ratio tests compare models with, and without a parameter, to test whether it contributes a significant amount of variance (Bates, et al., 2015).

<sup>1</sup> The notation “|” indicates that one level is embedded in another—e.g. (1 | Class: Professor) would calculate random intercepts for classes within professors.

<sup>2</sup> The notation “||” indicates that correlations between parameters are not to be calculated—e.g. (1 + Attitude<sub>pre</sub> || School) indicates that by-school random intercepts, and by-school Attitude<sub>pre</sub> random slopes should be calculated, but not the correlation between them.

Table S6. Effect of treatment in Study 2.

Variable of Interest	Model Specification / Fixed Effects	F test	b [95% CI]
<b>Treatment</b>	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester) <b>Fixed effects:</b> Attitude <sub>pre</sub> + Question + Treatment	Attitude <sub>pre</sub> $F(1, 2.2) = 175.1, p = .004$ Question $F(3, 972.1) = 10.9, p < .001$	Intercept: 2.14, [1.94, 2.33] 0.51, [0.44, 0.58] Interact: 0.23, [0.09, 0.37] Like: -0.10, [-0.23, 0.04] Similar: 0.24, [0.10, 0.38]
		<b>Treatment</b> $F(1, 328.8) = 9.0, p = .003$	<b>0.34, [0.12, 0.55]</b>
<b>Treatment</b>	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester)		Intercept: 2.08, [1.87, 2.29]
Excluding students taught by coauthor PK.	<b>Fixed effects:</b> Attitude <sub>pre</sub> + Question + Treatment	Attitude <sub>pre</sub> $F(1, 1.4) = 99.5, p = .030$ Question $F(3, 755.4) = 8.5, p < .001$	0.49, [0.40, 0.58] Interact: 0.23, [0.08, 0.39] Like: -0.09, [-0.24, 0.06] Similar: 0.22, [0.07, 0.37]
		<b>Treatment</b> $F(1, 251.1) = 4.9, p = .028$	<b>0.27, [0.03, 0.51]</b>
<b>Treatment</b>	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester) + (1   Professor)		Intercept: 2.15, [1.89, 2.42]
Excluding students taught by coauthor PK.	<b>Fixed effects:</b> Attitude <sub>pre</sub> + Question + Treatment + Age + Gender + Interest <sub>pre</sub> + Political Orientation	Attitude <sub>pre</sub> $F(1, 1.3) = 86.9, p = .035$ Question $F(3, 731.7) = 8.6, p < .001$	0.48, [0.39, 0.57] Interact: 0.27, [0.11, 0.42] Like: -0.07, [-0.22, 0.08] Similar: 0.23, [0.08, 0.38]
Controlling for pre-existing differences between treatment and wait-list groups:		Age $F(1, 239.6) = 7.0, p = .009$ Gender $F(1, 242.5) = 1.3, p = .258$ Interest <sub>pre</sub> $F(1, 256.6) = 2.4, p = .121$ Political Orientation $F(1, 242.1) = 4.3, p = .040$	-0.03, [-0.05, -0.01] -0.14, [-0.38, 0.10] 0.09, [-0.02, 0.20] -0.09, [-0.17, -0.01]
Age Gender (Female = 1) Interest <sub>pre</sub> Political Orientation		<b>Treatment</b> $F(1, 239.7) = 3.9, p = .049$	<b>0.26, [0.01, 0.51]</b>
<b>Treatment</b>	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>pre</sub>   Semester) + (1   Professor)		Intercept: 2.12, [1.81, 2.42]
Including by-professor random intercepts.	<b>Fixed effects:</b> Attitude <sub>pre</sub> + Question + Treatment	Attitude <sub>pre</sub> $F(1, 2.05) = 164.1, p = .005$ Question $F(3, 971.6) = 11.3, p < .001$	0.50, [0.09, 0.37] Interact: 0.23, [-0.23, 0.04] Like: -0.10, [-0.23, 0.04] Similar: 0.24, [0.11, 0.38]
		<b>Treatment</b> $F(1, 57.6) = 2.4, p = .124$	<b>0.26, [-0.05, 0.57]</b>

All degrees of freedom calculated using the Kenward-Roger approximation method using *lmerTest* (Kuznetsova et al., 2015) and *pbkr* packages (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). Confidence intervals are calculated using the bias corrected asymmetry method (bCA; Efron, 1987), with 5000 resamples. All continuous Ivs are mean-centered; categorical Ivs are dummy coded.

Table S7. Potential moderators in Study 2.

<b>Non-Significant Moderators</b>			
<b>Variable of Interest</b>	<b>Model Specification / Fixed Effect</b>	<b>F test</b>	<b>b [95% CI]</b>
<b>Treatment * Opinion Confidence<sub>Pre</sub></b>	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Semester) <b>Fixed effects:</b> Attitude <sub>Pre</sub> + Question + Treatment * Opinion Confidence <sub>Pre</sub>		<b>Intercept:</b> 2.13, [1.93, 2.33]
	Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>	$F(1, 2.2) = 170.9, p = .004$	0.51, [0.44, 0.58]
	Question	$F(3, 965.7) = 11.0, p < .001$	<b>Interact:</b> 0.23, [0.09, 0.38] <b>Like:</b> -0.09, [-0.23, 0.04] <b>Similar:</b> 0.24, [0.10, 0.38]
	Treatment	$F(1, 324.8) = 8.6, p = .004$	0.33, [0.11, 0.55]
	Opinion Confidence <sub>Pre</sub>	$F(1, 332.7) = 0.05, p = .817$	-0.02, [-0.17, 0.14]
	<b>Treatment * Opinion Confidence<sub>Pre</sub></b>	<b><math>F(1, 329.9) = 0.01, p = .928</math></b>	<b>0.01, [-0.18, 0.19]</b>
<b>Treatment * Knowledge<sub>Pre</sub></b>	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Semester) <b>Fixed effects:</b> Attitude <sub>Pre</sub> + Question + Treatment * Knowledge <sub>Pre</sub>		<b>Intercept:</b> 2.13, [1.92, 2.34]
	Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>	$F(1, 2.3) = 150.2, p = .004$	0.50, [0.42, 0.57]
	Question	$F(3, 930.1) = 10.0, p < .001$	<b>Interact:</b> 0.21, [0.07, 0.35] <b>Like:</b> -0.10, [-0.24, 0.03] <b>Similar:</b> 0.23, [0.09, 0.36]
	Treatment	$F(1, 312.5) = 8.8, p = .003$	0.35, [0.12, 0.58]
	Knowledge <sub>Pre</sub>	$F(1, 314.0) = 0.03, p = .856$	-0.02, [-0.22, 0.18]
	<b>Treatment * Knowledge<sub>Pre</sub></b>	<b><math>F(1, 311.4) = 0.13, p = .714</math></b>	<b>0.05, [-0.19, 0.28]</b>

All degrees of freedom calculated using the Kenward-Roger approximation method using *lmerTest* (Kuznetsova et al., 2015) and *pbkr* packages (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). Confidence intervals are calculated using the bias corrected asymmetry method (bCA; Efron, 1987), with 5000 resamples. All continuous Ivs are mean-centered; categorical Ivs are dummy coded.

Table S8. Potential confirmation bias in Study 2.

Variable of Interest	Model Specification / Fixed Effect	F test	b [95% CI]
Treatment * Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Semester) <b>Fixed effects:</b> Question + Treatment * Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>		Intercept: 2.14, [1.94, 2.34]
	Question	$F(3, 971.6) = 10.9, p < .001$	Interact: 0.23, [0.09, 0.37] Like: -0.10, [-0.23, 0.04] Similar: 0.24, [0.10, 0.38]
	Treatment	$F(1, 327.8) = 8.7, p = .003$	0.33, [0.11, 0.55]
	Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>	$F(1, 9.4) = 62.7, p < .001$	0.53, [0.41, 0.65]
	<b>Treatment * Attitude<sub>Pre</sub></b>	<b><math>F(1, 165.9) = 0.09, p = .767</math></b>	<b>-0.02, [-0.17, 0.12]</b>
Treatment * Professor Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Semester) <b>Fixed effects:</b> Question + Treatment * Professor Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>		Intercept: 2.15, [1.95, 2.35]
	Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>	$F(1, 2.2) = 167.7, p = .004$	0.51, [0.43, 0.58]
	Question	$F(3, 950.8) = 10.8, p < .001$	Interact: 0.22, [0.08, 0.36] Like: -0.09, [-0.23, 0.04] Similar: 0.25, [0.11, 0.39]
	Treatment	$F(1, 321.9) = 7.5, p = .006$	0.31, [0.09, 0.53]
	Professor Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>	$F(1, 332.8) = 0.63, p = .427$	0.08, [-0.11, 0.27]
	<b>Treatment * Professor Attitude<sub>Pre</sub></b>	<b><math>F(1, 342.0) = 0.42, p = .518</math></b>	<b>-0.07, [-0.28, 0.14]</b>
Treatment * Openness to Change <sub>Pre</sub>	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Semester) <b>Fixed effects:</b> Question + Treatment * Openness to Change <sub>Pre</sub>		Intercept: 2.13, [1.94, 2.33]
	Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>	$F(1, 2.2) = 163.5, p = .004$	0.50, [0.43, 0.57]
	Question	$F(3, 966.0) = 11.1, p < .001$	Interact: 0.24, [0.10, 0.38] Like: -0.10, [-0.23, 0.04] Similar: 0.24, [0.10, 0.38]
	Treatment	$F(1, 322.8) = 8.6, p = .004$	0.33, [0.11, 0.54]
	Openness to Change <sub>Pre</sub>	$F(1, 326.8) = 0.39, p = .531$	0.04, [-0.09, 0.17]
	<b>Treatment * Openness to Change<sub>Pre</sub></b>	<b><math>F(1, 324.1) = 1.4, p = .246</math></b>	<b>0.10, [-0.06, 0.26]</b>
Treatment * Political Orientation	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Semester) <b>Fixed effects:</b> Question + Treatment * Political Orientation		Intercept: 2.11, [1.92, 2.31]
1 – “Very Liberal”	Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>	$F(1, 2.2) = 170.1, p = .004$	0.50, [0.43, 0.57]
7 – “Very Conservative”	Question	$F(3, 971.8) = 11.1, p < .001$	Interact: 0.23, [0.09, 0.37] Like: -0.10, [-0.23, 0.04] Similar: 0.24, [0.10, 0.38]
	Treatment	$F(1, 324.1) = 10.3, p = .001$	0.36, [0.14, 0.58]
	Political Orientation	$F(1, 322.5) = 1.4, p = .246$	-0.07, [-0.19, 0.05]
	<b>Treatment * Political Orientation</b>	<b><math>F(1, 323.1) = 0.01, p = .910</math></b>	<b>-0.01, [-0.15, 0.14]</b>
Treatment * Professor Political Orientation	<b>Random Effects:</b> (1 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Student) + (0 + Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>   Semester) <b>Fixed effects:</b> Question + Treatment * Professor Political Orientation		Intercept: 2.10, [1.89, 2.30]
1 – “Very Liberal”	Attitude <sub>Pre</sub>	$F(1, 2.2) = 169.4, p = .004$	0.51, [0.44, 0.58]
7 – “Very Conservative”	Question	$F(3, 950.9) = 10.8, p < .001$	Interact: 0.22, [0.08, 0.36] Like: -0.09, [-0.23, 0.04] Similar: 0.25, [0.11, 0.39]
	Treatment	$F(1, 319.2) = 10.8, p = .001$	0.38, [0.16, 0.60]
	Professor Political Orientation	$F(1, 326.2) = 1.4, p = .238$	0.11, [-0.07, 0.29]
	<b>Treatment * Professor Political Orientation</b>	<b><math>F(1, 324.8) = 0.03, p = .858</math></b>	<b>-0.02, [-0.22, 0.18]</b>

All degrees of freedom calculated using the Kenward-Roger approximation method using *lmerTest* (Kuznetsova et al., 2015) and *pbkr* packages (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). Confidence intervals are calculated using the bias corrected asymmetry method (bCA; Efron, 1987), with 5000 resamples. All continuous Ivs are mean-centered; categorical Ivs are dummy coded.

Table S9. Post-class Pearson's correlations among # of reported terrorist groups and social affiliation.

Post-class measure		Social affiliation	Total correct groups	Middle Eastern / Islamic groups	Western groups	American groups
<b>Social affiliation</b> ( $\alpha = .79$ )	Pearson's r	—	0.208	0.159	0.059	0.032
	p-value	—	< .001	0.004	0.282	0.562
<b>Total correct groups</b>	Pearson's r		—	0.715	0.385	0.141
	p-value		—	< .001	< .001	0.009
<b>Middle Eastern / Islamic groups</b>	Pearson's r			—	0.013	-0.080
	p-value			—	0.803	0.138
<b>Western groups</b>	Pearson's r				—	0.695
	p-value				—	< .001
<b>American groups</b>	Pearson's r					—
	p-value					—

### Supplemental References

- Bates, D., Kliegl, K., Vasishth, S., & Baayen, H. (2015). Parsimonious mixed models. *ArXiv e-print; submitted to Journal of Memory and Language, 2015*. arXiv:1506.04967v1
- Efron, B. (1987). Better bootstrap confidence intervals. *Journal of the American Statistical Association, 82*(307), 171–185. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2289144>
- Halekoh, U., & Højsgaard, S. (2014). A Kenward-Roger approximation and parametric bootstrap methods for tests in linear mixed Models — The R package pbkrtest. *Journal of Statistical Software, 59*, 1–32. <http://dx.doi.org/10.18637/jss.v059.i09>
- Kuznetsova, A., Brockhoff, P. B., & Christensen, R. H. B. (2015). lmerTest: Tests in linear mixed effects models [Computer software manual]. <http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=lmerTest>. (R Package version 2.0-25).

**Appendix A: Course Readings:**  
**P. Krause; Terrorism, Insurgency, and Political Violence; Spring 2015**

**Class Plan**

**WEEK 1: What are Terrorism and Insurgency? Definitions and Cases Across History**

September 1: Defining Terrorism and Insurgency: A New or Old Phenomenon?

September 3: Film “The Weather Underground” Part I

**WEEK 2: Individual Level Causes and Objectives of Terrorism and Insurgency**

September 8: Psychology, Economics, Education

September 10: Film “The Weather Underground” Part II

**WEEK 3: Organizational, Strategic Level Causes and Objectives of Terrorism and Insurgency**

September 15: Religion, Gender, Ideology

September 17: Solidarity, Networks, and Numbers; Organizational Survival and Competition

**WEEK 4: Methods and Mechanisms: Strategies of Terrorism and Insurgency**

September 22: Political Grievances and Occupation; Failed States and State Sponsors

September 24: Strategies of Terrorism and Insurgency- Academics

**WEEK 5: Methods and Mechanisms: Suicide Bombing and WMD**

September 29: Strategies of Terrorism and Insurgency- Practitioners

October 1: Suicide Bombing and Weapons of Mass Destruction in Terrorism and Insurgency

**WEEK 6: Morality and the Media**

October 6: Morality, Emotions, and the Media in Terrorism and Insurgency

October 8: Exam #1

**WEEK 7: The Impact and Effectiveness of Terrorism and Insurgency**

October 13: Individual and Organizational Level Effects: Fear, Casualties, Support, Group Strength

October 15: Strategic Level Effects: Political Concessions, Military Withdrawals, New States

**WEEK 8: Al-Qaeda**

October 20: Al-Qaeda: The Past

October 22: Al-Qaeda: The Present and Future

**WEEK 9: The Boundaries of Terrorism: Nonviolence and State Terror**

October 27: Nonviolence and Non-Lethal Violence

October 29: States and Terrorism: Repression, Mass Violence, and Genocide

**WEEK 10: The Insurgencies in Iraq and Syria**

November 3: The Causes, Dynamics, and Effects of the Insurgencies

November 5: Foreign Fighters, ISIS, and Insurgent Rivalries

**WEEK 11: Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency I**

November 10: Exam #2 and “If a Tree Falls”

November 12: How Terrorism and Insurgency End

**WEEK 12: Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency II**

November 17: CT and COIN Debates: Hard & Soft Power, Democratization, Threat Inflation

November 19: The Freedom of Speech, Profiling and Airport Security, Torture

**WEEK 13: Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency III**

November 24: Drones and Intelligence Agencies

November 26: \*Happy Thanksgiving\*

**WEEK 14: The Boston Marathon Bombings**

December 1: Definitions, Causes, and the Media

December 3: Effects, Community Response, and the Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Trial

**WEEK 15: Terrorism, Insurgency, and Political Violence, Now and in the Future**

December 7: Remaining Questions and Lessons Learned

## Readings and Class Schedule

### Before Classes Begin

*By Monday, August 31 at noon (the day before the first class meeting), you must email Professor Krause your own 1-2 sentence definition of "terrorism" without consulting any sources. Please send your definition to peter.krause.2@bc.edu with the subject heading "PO352701 Terrorism Definition". This assignment will be graded for timely completion.*

### WEEK 1: What are Terrorism and Insurgency? Definitions and Cases Across History

#### *Key Questions*

How do scholars, governments, the media, and the public define terrorism and insurgency? Are terrorism and insurgency distinct concepts? How are they similar and different? Is terrorism a new or old phenomenon? What are some key cases of terrorism and insurgency?

#### *Skills Introduced*

Defining and comparing concepts

### September 1: Defining Terrorism and Insurgency: A New or Old Phenomenon?

#### *Required Readings*

- . Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Ch. 1, pp. 1-41 □
- . John Gerring, "What Makes a Concept Good? A Critical Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences," *Polity*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1999), Table 1, pp. 367 □
- . David Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 78, No. 3 (1984) pp. 658-677 □
- . Alexander Spencer and Rohan Gunaratna, "Is the New Terrorism Really New?" in *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Ch. 1, pp. 1-34 □

#### *Recommended Readings* □

- Alison M. Jaggar, "What Is Terrorism, Why Is It Wrong, and Could It Ever Be Morally Permissible?" *Journal of Social Philosophy*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2005) pp. 202-215 □
- Colin Beck and Emily Miner, "Who Gets Designated a Terrorist and Why?" *Social Forces* Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 837-858 □
- Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoeffler, "The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2004) pp. 777-794
- Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, eds., *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005) □
- Martha Crenshaw, "Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Context," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995)

- John Horgan and Michael Boyle, “The Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2008) pp. 51-64 □

September 3: Film “The Weather Underground” Part I □

**WEEK 2: Individual Level Causes and Objectives of Terrorism and Insurgency □**

*Key Questions □*

- Who are the key actors in terrorism and insurgency campaigns?
- What are the levels of analysis for examining terrorism and insurgency?
- Do mental illness, poverty, a lack of education, ideology, gender, or religion cause terrorism? □
- How can an individual become radicalized? Is ‘radicalization’ necessary to commit terrorism?

*Skills Introduced*

How to read as a scholar and analyst: Identifying and critiquing arguments What is political science? Understanding variables, theories, predictions, tests, and evidence How to generate theories and hypotheses

September 8: Psychology, Economics, Education

*Required Readings*

- “You Don’t Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows,” “A Declaration of War,” and “Headquarters” in Bernadine Dorhn, Bill Ayers, and Jeff Jones, eds., *Sing a Battle Song: The Revolutionary Poetry, Statements, and Communiqués of the Weather Underground 1970-1974* (New York: Seven Stories, 2006) □
- Ehud Sprinzak, “The Psychopolitical Formation of Extreme Left Terrorism in a Democracy: The Case of the Weathermen,” in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998) pp. 65-85 □
- Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, “Why Are There So Many Engineers Among Islamic Radicals?” *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (2009) pp. 201-230 □
- James A. Piazza and Karin von Hippel, “Does Poverty Serve as a Root Cause of Terrorism?” in Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Ch. 2, pp. 35-68 □
- “Global Terrorism Index 2014,” Institute for Economics and Peace, p. 59

*Recommended Readings □*

- John Horgan, “From Profiles and Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 618, No. 1 (2008) pp. 80-94 □
- Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2005) pp. 3-42 □
- Alan Krueger and Jitka Malečková, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (2003) pp. 119-144 □

September 10: Film “The Weather Underground” Part II □

**WEEK 3: Organizational, Strategic Level Causes and Objectives of Terrorism and**

## Insurgency

### Key Questions

- Are most terrorist attacks committed by unconnected individuals or organizations? □
- What is collective action and when is it achieved?
- When and why does organizations' pursuit of strength and survival generate violence?
- What political environments and government types make terrorism more likely?
- Does military occupation cause terrorism? □

### Skills Introduced □

Causal Inference: How do we know when X causes Y? □

## September 15: Religion, Gender, Ideology □

### Required Readings □

- Mark Juergensmeyer, "Soldiers for Christ," in *Terror in the Mind of God*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003) pp. 19-43
- Mark Juergensmeyer, "Zion Betrayed," in *Terror in the Mind of God*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003) pp. 45-60 □
- Caron Gentry and Laura Sjoberg, "The Gendering of Women's Terrorism," in *Women, Gender, and Terrorism*, Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, eds. (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 2011), pp. 59-70 □
- Alexis Henshaw, "Taking Female Armed Rebels Seriously," *The Washington Post* (April 11, 2015) □
- Dan Byman, "Five Myths About Violent Extremism," *The Washington Post* (February 13, 2015)

### Recommended Readings □

- Mia Bloom, *Bombshell: Women and Terrorism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011) □
- Alessandro Orsini, *Anatomy of the Red Brigades: The Religious Mindset of Modern Terrorists* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009) □
- Mattias Gardell, "Crusader Dreams: Oslo 22/7, Islamophobia, and the Quest for a Monocultural Europe," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2014) pp. 129-155 □
- James A. Piazza, "Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous? An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal Structure," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2009) pp. 62-88 □
- Richard Jackson, "Constructing Enemies: 'Islamist Terrorism' in Political and Academic Discourse," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2007) pp. 394-426 □
- Cynthia K. Mahmood, *Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Militants* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996) □

## September 17: Solidarity, Networks, and Numbers; Organizational Survival and Competition

### Required Readings □

- Mancur Olson, "Introduction" in *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) pp. 1-3 □
- Marc Sageman, "Joining the Jihad" in *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of

- Pennsylvania Press, 2004) pp. 99-135 □
- Mia Bloom, "Outbidding, Market Share, and Palestinian Suicide Bombing," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 119, No. 1 (2004) pp. 61-88 □
- Peter Krause, "The Structure of Success: How the Internal Distribution of Power Drives Armed Group Behavior and National Movement Effectiveness," *International Security*, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 72-116
- Recommended Readings* □
- Paul Staniland, "States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2012) pp. 243-264 □
- Shawn Flanigan, "Nonprofit Service Provision by Insurgent Organizations: The Cases of Hizballah and the Tamil Tigers," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 31, No. 6 (2008) pp. 499-517 □
- Eitan Alimi, "Contextualizing Political Terrorism: A Collective Action Perspective for Understanding the Tanzim," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2006) pp. 263-283 □
- Wendy Pearlman, "Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords," *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2008) pp. 79-109 □
- Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, "How to Start a Battalion (In Five Easy Lessons)," *London Review of Books*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2013) pp. 13-14 □

#### **WEEK 4: Methods and Mechanisms: Strategies of Terrorism and Insurgency** □

##### *Key Questions* □

What are the main strategies of terrorism and insurgency?

What is the causal logic of each strategy?

Under what conditions is each strategy most likely to succeed or fail?

Do observers' assessments of terrorist strategies match with those of the perpetrators?

##### *Skills Introduced*

Identifying and explaining causal mechanisms

Linking theory and practice

Identifying gaps in scholarship

#### September 22: Political Grievances and Occupation; Failed States and State Sponsors

##### *Required Readings*

- Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Ch. 2, pp. 43-62 □
- Erica Chenoweth, "Terrorism and Democracy," *The Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 16, pp. 355-375 □
- Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) pp. 10-15, 21-78 □

##### *Recommended Readings* □

- Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1993) pp. 27-35 □
- Paul Stern, "Why Do People Sacrifice for Their Nations?" *Political Psychology*, Vol. 16., No. 2 (1995)

pp. 217-235

- Mia Bloom, "Death Becomes Her: Women, Occupation, and Terrorist Mobilization," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2010), pp. 445-450
- James A. Piazza, "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52 (2008) pp. 469-473, 481-485

#### September 24: Strategies of Terrorism and Insurgency- Academics

##### *Required Readings*

- Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," *International Security* Vol. 31, No. 1 (2006) pp. 56-80
- David Lake, "Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty First Century," *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2002) pp. 15-29
- Stathis Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," *Rationality and Society*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1999) pp. 252-259

##### *Recommended Readings*

- Ian Lustick. "Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Targets and Audiences" in Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995) pp. 514-533
- Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Choice," *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism* Vol. 2, No. 1 (1998) pp. 54-64
- Ignacio Cuenca, "The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (September 2007) pp. 289-206
- Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, "The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 70, No. 2 (2008) pp. 437-449

#### **WEEK 5: Methods and Mechanisms: Suicide Bombing and WMD**

##### *Key Questions*

Are suicide bombing and WMD attacks major threats?

How can we assess intentions vs. capability?

Why do some groups choose to employ these methods and others do not?

##### *Skills Introduced*

Operationalizing variables and testing predictions

#### September 29: Strategies of Terrorism and Insurgency- Practitioners

##### *Required Readings*

- Carlos Marighella, "Problem and Principles of Strategy," and "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla," in James Kohl and John Litt, eds., *Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974) pp. 81-86, 108-133
- Menachem Begin, *The Revolt* (New York: Nash, 1977) pp. 47-58, 76-96
- Mao Tse-Tung, *Basic Tactics* (New York: Praeger, 1967) pp. 51-68
- Abu Bakr Naji, "The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass," trans. William McCants, pp. 18-20, 28-34

□ Ayman Al-Zawahiri letter to Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, July 9, 2005

*Recommended Readings*

- Che Guevara, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1961) □

October 1: Suicide Bombing and Weapons of Mass Destruction in Terrorism and Insurgency

□ *Required Readings* □

- Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (2003) pp. 343-361 □
- Scott Atran, “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism,” *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 29, No. 2 (2006) pp. 127-147 □
- Lindsey O’Rourke, “Behind the Woman Behind the Bomb,” *The New York Times* (August 2, 2008)
- Matthew Bunn and Susan Martin, “Is Nuclear Terrorism a Real Threat?” in Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Ch. 6, pp. 172-199 □
- Richard Danzig et al., “Aum Shinrikyo: Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons,” *Center for a New American Security* (2012) pp. 9-41 □

*Recommended Readings* □

- Michael C. Horowitz, “Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism,” *International Organization* Vol. 64, No. 1 (2010) pp. 33-64 □
- Greg Koblentz, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare,” *International Security* Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/2004) pp. 84-122 □
- Assaf Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks,” *International Security* Vol. 33, No. 3 (Winter 2008/2009) pp. 46-78 □
- Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists,” *International Security* Vol. 38, No. 1 (2013) pp. 80-104 □

**WEEK 6: Morality and the Media** □

*Key Questions* □

How do feelings of rage, humiliation, fear, depression, revenge, and injustice impact terrorism?

How does the media impact the causes, mechanisms, and effects of terrorism?

How should the media balance profit, the public’s ‘need to know,’ and responsibility to society? □

October 6: Morality, Emotions, and the Media in Terrorism and Insurgency □

*Required Readings* □

- Eamon Collins, *Killing Rage* (London: Granta Books, 1997) pp. 1-29 □
- Bruce Hoffman, “The Old Media, Terrorism, and Public Opinion,” and “The New Media, Terrorism, and the Shaping of Global Opinion,” in Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Ch. 6 and 7, pp. 173-228 □
- Gadi Wolfsfeld et al., “Covering Death in Conflicts: Coverage of the Second Intifada on Israeli and Palestinian Television,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2008) pp. 401-417 □
- Agence France-Presse, “Paris Supermarket Hostages Sue Media Over Live Coverage” (April 3, 2015)

*Recommended Readings*

- Roger Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern*

- Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
- Fredric Wehrey, "A Clash of Wills: Hizballah's Psychological Campaigns against Israel in South Lebanon," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* Vol. 13, No. 3 (2002) pp. 53-74
  - Gabriel Weimann, "The Psychology of Mass-Mediated Terrorism," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 52, No. 1 (2008) pp. 69-86
  - James Sheehan et al., "Al-Shabaab's Propaganda War and Alternative Media" (2012) pp. 29-39

October 8: \*Exam #1\*

## **WEEK 7: The Impact and Effectiveness of Terrorism and Insurgency**

### *Key Questions*

- How many people are killed and wounded by terrorist and insurgent attacks?
- Do terrorism and insurgency achieve the personal goals of the attackers?
- How does the use of violence impact the strength and survival of organizations?
- When and why does the public support terrorism and insurgency?
- Do terrorism and insurgency generate political concessions? Do they win wars?
- What is the economic and social impact of terrorism and insurgency?

### *Skills Introduced*

- Conceptualizing and measuring effects
- Generating and analyzing competing arguments
- Marshaling and analyzing relevant evidence

## October 13: Individual and Organizational Level Effects: Fear, Casualties, Support, Group Strength

### □ *Required Readings*

- Jennifer Lerner et al, "Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment," *Psychological Science* Vol. 14 No. 2 (2003) pp. 144-150
- Christophe Chovanietz, "Rallying Around the Flag or Railing Against the Government? Political Parties' Reactions to Terrorist Acts," *Party Politics* Vol. 17, No. 5 (2011) pp. 673-698
- Glenn Feldman, "Soft Opposition: Elite Acquiescence and Klan-Sponsored Terrorism in Alabama, 1946- 1950," *The Historical Journal* Vol. 40, No. 3 (1997) pp. 753-777
- David Chalmers, *Backfire: How the Ku Klux Klan Helped the Civil Rights Movement* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003) pp. 137-144

### *Recommended Readings*

- "Global Terrorism Index 2014," Institute for Economics and Peace
- Jodi Vittori, "All Struggles Must End: The Longevity of Terrorist Groups," *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol. 30, No. 3 (2009) pp. 444-466
- Ethan Bueno De Mesquita and Eric Dickson, "The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization," *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 51, No. 2 (2007) pp. 364-381

## October 15: Strategic Level Effects: Political Concessions, Military Withdrawals, New States

### □ *Required Readings*

- Robert Pape, "Learning Terrorism Pays," in *Dying to Win* (New York: Random House, 2006) p. 40, 61-76 □
- Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *International Security* Vol. 31, No. 2 (2006) pp. 42-52 □
- Peter Krause, "The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: A Two-Level Framework To Transform a Deceptive Debate," *Security Studies* Vol. 22, No. 2 (2013) pp. 259-294
- Timothy Wickham-Crowley, "A Qualitative Comparative Approach to Latin American Revolutions," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 32, Nos.1 and 2 (January-April 1991), pp. 87-90, 99-105

#### *Recommended Readings*

- Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," *International Organization* Vol. 56, No. 2 (2002) pp. 263-96 □
- Kelly Greenhill and Solomon Major, "The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords," *International Security* Vol. 31, no. 3 (Winter 2006/07) pp. 7-40 □
- Kathleen Cunningham, "Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States Respond to Internally Divided Separatists?" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 105, No. 2 (2011) pp. 275-97 □
- Max Abrahms and Peter Krause Exchange on Krause's *Security Studies* Article, *H-Diplo* (2013)

### **WEEK 8: Al-Qaeda** □

#### *Key Questions* □

What are the origins of Al-Qaeda? What is its ideology and strategy?

What is transnational terrorism and what distinguishes it from other types?

Is Al-Qaeda a unique group, or do they share similarities with other organizations?

Is Al-Qaeda on the ropes, on the rise, or at an impasse? What is its future? □

#### *Skills Introduced* □

How to generate and frame general and specific research questions

What is a case? Case selection and research design □

### October 20: Al-Qaeda: The Past □

#### *Required Readings* □

- Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower*, Ch. 5-7, 13-20 □
- Osama Bin Laden, "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places" (August 23, 1996) □

#### *Recommended Readings* □

- "Bin Laden's Bookshelf" (Collection of Documents Captured During Raid on May 1, 2011) □
- Osama Bin Laden, "Letter to the American People" (November 24, 2002) □
- Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin, 2005) □
- Thomas H. Kean, Lee Hamilton, et al., *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005) □

- Peter Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2001) □
- Fawaz Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) □

### October 22: Al-Qaeda: The Present and Future □

#### *Required Readings* □

- Daniel Byman, “Buddies or Burdens? Understanding the Al Qaeda Relationship with Its Affiliate Organizations,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2014) pp. 431-470 □
- Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Lone Wolf Islamic Terrorism: Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (Carlos Bledsoe) Case Study,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2014) pp. 110-128 □
- “Al-Qaeda’s Use of Female Suicide Bombers in Iraq: A Case Study,” in *Women, Gender, and Terrorism*, Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, eds. (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 2011), pp. 159-175 □
- Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” *The New York Times* (July 29, 2014) □

#### *Recommended Readings*

- Anthony Lemieux et al, “Inspire Magazine: A Critical Analysis of its Significance and Potential Impact Through the Lens of the Information, Motivation, and Behavioral Skills Model,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2012) pp. 354-371 □
- Risa Brooks, “Muslim ‘Homegrown’ Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the Threat?” *International Security* Vol. 36, No. 2 (2011) pp. 7-47 □
- William McCants, “How Zawahiri Lost al Qaeda,” *Foreign Affairs* (November 19, 2013) □
- Bruce Hoffman, “American Jihad,” *The National Interest* No. 107 (May/June 2010) pp. 17-27 □
- Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice □between Domestic and Foreign Fighting,” *American Political Science Review* Vol. 107, No. 1 (2013) pp. 1-15 □

### **WEEK 9: The Boundaries of Terrorism: Nonviolence and State Terror** □

#### *Key Questions* □

What is the same and different about the causes, mechanisms, and effects of insurgency and civil war as compared to terrorism?

When and why is nonviolence more effective than terrorism and insurgency?

Is there ‘ecoterrorism’ and is it comparable to other forms of terrorism? □

Is there “state terrorism”? Should we adjust the common definition of terrorism to include it?

How many civilians do states and non-state actors kill? What are the causes of mass killing by states?

#### *Skills Introduced* □

Comparing cases □

### October 27: Nonviolence and Non-Lethal Violence □

#### *Required Readings* □

- Stefan Leader and Peter Probst, "The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol. 15, No. 4 (2003) pp. 37-58 □
  - Blythe Copeland, "5 Ways Sea Shepherd's Controversial Methods are Changing the World For Whales," *Treehugger* (February 23, 2011) □
  - Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler and Cas Mudde, "Ecoterrorism: Threat Or Political Ploy?" *The Washington Post* (December 19, 2014) □
  - Gene Sharp, "The Intifadah and Nonviolent Struggle," *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 19, No. 1 (1989) pp. 3-13 □
  - Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Political Conflict," *International Security* Vol. 33, No. 1 (2008) pp. 7-44
- Recommended Readings* □
- Fabio Rojas, "Social Movement Tactics, Organizational Change and the Spread of African-American Studies," *Social Forces* Vol. 84, No. 4 (June 2006) pp. 2139-2158 □
  - Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics* Vol. 27, No. 2 (1975) pp. 175-200 □
  - Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* Vol. 26, No. 1 (2001) pp. 93-128 □
  - Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, "Dilettantes, Ideologues, and the Weak: Terrorists Who Don't Kill," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2008) pp. 244-260 □
  - Leena Malkki, "Political Elements in Post-Columbine School Shootings in Europe and North America," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2014) pp. 185-210 □

#### October 29: States and Rebel Governance: State Terrorism and Insurgents as State Builders

##### *Required Readings*

- Ruth Blakeley, "Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies," *European Political Science* Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 2007) pp. 228-236 □
- Noam Chomsky, "The United States is a Leading Terrorist State," *Monthly Review*, Vol. 53, No. 6 (November 2001) pp. 1-8 □
- Paul Staniland, "States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders," *Perspectives on Politics* Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 2012) pp. 243-264 □
- Tim Arango, "ISIS Transforming Into Functioning State That Uses Terror as Tool," *The New York Times* (July 21, 2015) □

##### *Recommended Readings* □

- Martha Crenshaw, "The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War," in *Terrorism in Context* (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2007) pp. 473-513 □
- Ben Valentino et al., "'Draining the Sea': Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare," *International Organization* Vol. 58, No. 2 (2004) pp. 375-407 □
- Alex Downes, "Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy," *Civil Wars* Vol. 9, No. 4 (2007) pp. 420-444 □
- Alexander George, ed., *Western State Terrorism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991). □
- Paul Wilkinson, "Can A State Be 'Terrorist'?" *International Affairs* Vol. 57, No. 3 (1981) pp. 467-472 □

**WEEK 10: The Insurgencies in Iraq and Syria** □*Key Questions* □

How and why did the insurgencies in Iraq and Syria begin?

How have the ruling regimes and foreign states responded?

How was ISIS created, and what explains its variation in strategy and effectiveness over time?

What explains the shifting alliances among insurgent groups across time and space? □

*Skills Introduced* □

Analyzing theories and cases: process-tracing and congruence testing □

November 3: The Causes, Dynamics, and Effects of the Insurgencies □*Required Readings* □

- Wendy Pearlman, “Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings,” *Perspectives on Politics* Vol. 11, No. 2 (2013) pp. 387-409 □
- Stathis Kalyvas, “The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War,” *The Journal of Ethics* Vol. 8, No. 1 (2004) pp. 97-138 □
- James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 97, No. 1 (February 2003) pp. 75-77 □
- James Fearon, “Obstacles to Ending Syria’s Civil War,” *Foreign Policy* (December 10, 2013) □

November 5: Foreign Fighters, ISIS, and Insurgent Rivalries □*Required Readings* □

- William McCants, “The Believer: How an Introvert with a Passion for Religion and Soccer Became Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Leader of the Islamic State,” *Brookings*, September 1, 2015 □
- Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” *The Atlantic* (March 2015) □
- Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants: The Response,” *The Atlantic* (February 24, 2015) □
- Christoph Reuter, “The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State,” *Spiegel Online* (April 18, 2015) □
- Thomas Hegghammer, “Syria’s Foreign Fighters,” *Foreign Policy* (December 9, 2013) □
- “Global Terrorism Index 2014,” Institute for Economics and Peace, pp. 50-52 □
- Hasnain Kazim, “Interview with an Islamic State Recruiter: ‘Democracy Is For Infidels,’” *Spiegel Online* (October 28, 2014) □
- Roula Khalaf and Sam Jones, “Selling Terror: How ISIS Details Its Brutality,” *Financial Times* (June 17, 2014) □
- Ariel Ahram, “Sexual and Ethnic Violence and the Construction of the Islamic State,” *Political Violence @ a Glance* (September 18, 2014) □

*Recommended Readings* □

- Baghdadi’s first speech after declaration of ‘caliphate’ (July 1, 2014)  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VOORW63ioY0> □
- Charlie Winter, “The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy,” *Quilliam* (2015) □

**WEEK 11: Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency I***Key Questions*

When, why, and how do terrorism and insurgency end?

What are the objectives and strategies of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency?

November 10: \*Exam #2 and “If a Tree Falls”\*

November 12: How Terrorism and Insurgency End (Proposal Due)

*Required Readings*

□ Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How Al Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” *International Security* Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006) pp. 7-48

□ John Horgan, *Walking Away From Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2009) pp. 27-39, 50-62

□ Peter Neumann, “Negotiating With Terrorists,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 1 (2007) pp. 128-138

□ Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, “Mowing the Grass in Gaza,” BESA Center Paper No. 255, July 2014

□ Micah Zenko, “Terrorism is Booming Almost Everywhere But in the United States,” *Foreign Policy* (June 19, 2015)

*Recommended Readings*

□ Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda* (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 2008)

□ Ben Connable and Martin Libicki, “How Insurgencies End,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010)

**WEEK 12: Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency II***Key Questions*

What are the organizations involved in U.S. counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts?

Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency work? Do they have unintended consequences?

*Skills Introduced*

Linking theory and evidence to policy, and vice versa

November 17: CT and COIN Debates: Hard & Soft Power, Democratization, Threat Inflation

*Required Readings*

□ John Mueller, “Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol. 17, No. 4 (2005) pp. 487-505

□ Richard Betts, Daniel Byman, and Martha Crenshaw, “Comments on John Mueller’s ‘Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism,’” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (2005), pp. 507-521

□ Ayaan Hirsi Ali, “A Problem From Heaven,” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2015)

□ Williams McCants, “Islamic Scripture Is Not the Problem,” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2015)

□ Gregory Gause and Jennifer Windsor, “Can Spreading Democracy Help Defeat Terrorism?” in Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Ch. 8, pp. 243-275

*Recommended Readings* □

- Brigitte Nacos and Michael Rubin, “Counterterrorism Strategies: Do We Need Bombs Over Bridges?” in □Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Ch. 7, pp. 209-242 □
- Williams McCants and Clint Watts, “U.S. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment,” □*Foreign Policy Research Institute* (December 2012) □
- Robert Art and Louise Richardson, eds. *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past*. (Washington, □D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007) □
- Peter Krause and Stephen Van Evera, “Public Diplomacy: Ideas for the War of Ideas,” *Middle East Policy* □Vol. 16, No. 3 (Fall 2009) pp. 106-134 □
- Cass Sunstein, “Terrorism and Probability Neglect,” *The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* Vol. 26, No. 2/3 □(2003) pp. 121-136 □
- Ami Pedhazur, “Struggling with the Challenge of Right-Wing Extremism in Democracies,” *Studies in □Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 24, No. 5 (September 2001) pp. 339-359 □
- Ian Lustick, *Trapped in the War on Terror* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006) □

November 19: The Freedom of Speech, Profiling and Airport Security, Torture

*Required Readings* □

- Conor Friedersdorf, “Why the Reaction Is Different When the Terrorist Is White,” *The Atlantic* (Aug 8, □2012) □
- Abby Ohlheiser and Elahe Izadi, “Police: Austin Shooter was a ‘Homegrown American Extremist’” *The □Washington Post* (December 1, 2014) □
- Jonathan Turley, “The Biggest Threat To French Free Speech Isn’t Terrorism. It’s The Government,” □*The Washington Post* (January 8, 2015) □
- “Twitter suspends account of Hamas’ military wing,” *Haaretz* (January 14, 2014) □
- Matthew Yglesias, “Two—But Only Two—Cheers for Blasphemy,” *Vox* (January 8, 2015) □
- Charles Kenny, “Airport Security is Killing Us,” *Businessweek* (November 18, 2012) □
- Justin Fishel et al, “Undercover DHS Tests Reveal Security Failures at US Airports,” *ABC* (June 1, 2015) □
- Michael Posner and Alan Dershowitz, “Is an Outright Ban the Best Way to Eliminate or Constrain □Torture?” in Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Ch.10, pp. 312-344 □
- John Yoo and David Cole, “ Counterterrorism and the Constitution: Does Providing Security Require a □Trade-off with Civil Liberties?” in Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Ch. 11, pp. 345-379 □

*Recommended Readings* □

- James McAllister, Jonathan Kirshner, Austin Long, Robert Pape, Joshua Rovner, “Forum on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Report and the United States’ Post-9/11 Policy on Torture,” H-Diplo | ISSF Forum, No. 5 (2015) □
- Ron Hassner, “Fundamentalist Wrath,” *Washington Post* (January 12, 2015) □
- Darren W. Davis and Brian D. Silver, “Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the □Terrorist Attacks on America,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (January 2004) pp. 28-46 □

- Matthew Alexander, *How to Break a Terrorist* (New York: Free Press, 2008) □
- Gary Crowdus, "Terrorism and Torture in The Battle of Algiers: An Interview with Saadi Yacef," □  
□Cineaste Vol. 29, No. 3 (Summer 2004) pp. 30-37 □

### **WEEK 13: Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency III**

#### *Key Questions*

- Is terrorism a significant threat to you, your society, your country, and the world?
- How does the U.S. justice system deal with terrorism and terrorist suspects and perpetrators?
- What are the tactics of the Department of Homeland Security for counterterrorism?
- Is the current U.S. approach to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency the right one?
- How should the U.S. balance concerns of security and liberty in dealing with terrorism?

#### *Skills Introduced*

How to write a research paper

#### November 24: Drones and Intelligence Agencies

##### *Required Readings*

- Daniel Byman, "Why Drones Work" *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2013) □
- Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Why Drones Fail" *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2013) □
- Dylan Matthews, "Everything You Need to Know About the Drone Debate, in One FAQ," *The Washington Post* (March 8, 2013) □
- Jeremy Scahill and Ryan Devereaux, "Barack Obama's Secret Terrorist-Tracking System, By the Numbers," *The Intercept* (August 5, 2014) □
- Barton Gellman and Laura Poitras, "U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program," *The Washington Post* (June 6, 2013) □
- Daniel Solove, "Why Privacy Matters Even If You Have 'Nothing to Hide,'" *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (May 15, 2011) □
- Peter Bergen et al. "Do NSA's Bulk Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorism?" *New America* (2014) □
- Michael Hirsh, "The Next Bin Laden," *National Journal* (November 14, 2013)

##### *Recommended Readings* □

- Austin Long, "Whack-a-Mole or Coup de Grace? Institutionalization and Leadership Targeting in Iraq and Afghanistan," *Security Studies* Vol. 23, No. 3 (2014) pp. 471-512 □
- Patrick Johnston, "Does Decapitation Work?: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," *International Security* Vol. 36, No. 4 (2012) pp. 47-79 □
- Jenna Jordan, "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation," *Security Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (December 2009) pp. 719-755 □
- Ronen Bergman, "The Hezbollah Connection," *The New York Times* (February 10, 2015) □
- M.S., "Why We Spy: The War on Terror is Obama's Vietnam," *The Economist* (June 10, 2013) □

#### November 26: Have a Happy Thanksgiving!

*Assignment:* Impress your family members with your newfound knowledge about terrorism and political violence, then defeat them in political debates using said knowledge. □

## WEEK 14: The Boston Marathon Bombings □

### Key Questions □

How do theory and history help us to explain what happened?

Were these attacks ‘terrorism’? What were the causes of the attacks? How did various types of media cover them?

What aspects of this attack were common, anomalous?

Why did the government and the community react the way that they did? Should anything have been done differently? What should be the outcome of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s trial?

### Skills Introduced

How to apply theory to current events

### December 1: Definitions, Causes, and the Media

#### Required Readings

- Jess Bidgood, “Link to Marathon Bombing Rattles City Known for Its Tolerance,” *The New York Times* □(June 4, 2013) □
- Jim Mackinnon, “Bill Ayers Defends Weather Underground Bombings,” *Akron Beacon* (May 4, 2013) □
- Ken Bensinger and Andrea Chang, “Boston Bombings: Social Media Spirals Out of Control,” *The Los Angeles Times* (April 20, 2013) □
- “Rolling Stone Defends Cover Featuring Boston Marathon Bombing Suspect,” *CBS News* (July 17, 2013) □

### December 3: Effects, Community Response, and the Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Trial

#### Required Readings □

- David Montgomery et al, “Police, Citizens and Technology Factor into Boston Bombing Probe,” *The Washington Post* (April 20, 2013) □
  - Ayaan Hirsi Ali, “The Problem of Muslim Leadership,” *The Wall Street Journal* (May 27, 2013) □
  - Wardah Khalid, “Day by Day: An American Muslim’s Thoughts After the Boston Attack,” *The Huffington Post* (April 23, 2013) □
  - Conor Friedersdorf, “Falsely Accused in Boston: 3 Examples and What They Should Teach Us,” *The Atlantic* (April 19, 2013) □
  - Anonymous Security Professional, “Thoughts on Responding to the Boston Bombings” □
  - Frank Bruni, “The Lesson of Boston,” *The New York Times* (April 27, 2013) □
  - Peter Krause, “BC Should Respond to Attacks with Renewed Community Spirit,” *The Heights* (April 15, 2013) □
  - Austin Tedesco, “Students Organize ‘Last 5’ Walk, Vigil as Memorial Events,” *The Heights* (April 18, 2013) □
  - Bill and Denise Richards, “To End The Anguish, Drop The Death Penalty,” *The Boston Globe*
- Recommended Readings □
- “Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons From the Boston Marathon Bombings” Harvard Kennedy School (April 2014)

## **WEEK 15: Terrorism, Insurgency, and Political Violence, Now and in the Future**

### *Key Questions*

What are the major lessons we learned in this course? What questions remain unanswered?

What is the future of terrorism, insurgency, and political violence?

### *Skills Introduced*

How to read the news

How to generate policy implications

### December 7: Remaining Questions and Lessons Learned

#### *Required Readings*

- Husna Haq, “Why #I’llRideWithYou Worked, and Other Muslims Hashtags Didn’t,” *Christian Science Monitor* (December 15, 2014)
- Arit John, “With the NAACP Bombing, the Media-Coverage Gap Went Viral,” *Bloomberg* (January 8, 2015)
- Linda Robinson, “The Future of Counterterrorism: Fewer Drones, More Partnerships,” *The Washington Post* (October 28, 2013)
- Antonia Blumberg, “Sikhs Mark Anniversary Of Temple Shooting With Community Service,” *Huffington Post* (July 31, 2015)
- One news article of your choice from the past week